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The increasing shipping activity in the Gulf of Finland has raised concerns about the 
safety of maritime traffic, especially about the possibility of a large oil accident due to 
the increasing oil export activity of Russia in the area. Various international, supra-
national, regional and national policy instruments aim at minimizing the risks of 
accidents and other harmful effects of shipping.  
 
This report is concerned with maritime safety policy instruments: policy instruments in 
general; the central regulatory bodies of maritime safety; the maritime safety policy 
instruments and the future prospects of maritime policy; the effectiveness of policy 
instruments; and the critique of the current maritime safety policy system. The purpose 
of the report is to review the structure and state of the maritime safety policy system 
with focus on the Gulf of Finland. 
 
This report has been written as a part of the research project “SAFGOF – Evaluation of 
traffic increase in the Gulf of Finland 2007-2015 and the effect of the increase on the 
environment and traffic chain activities” of Kotka Maritime Research Centre, and it is 
the result of Work Package 6 “Political and social instruments, guidelines and economic 
incentives”. The research has been carried out by the Centre for Maritime Studies of the 
University of Turku. The research project is financed by the European Union – 
European Regional Development Fund – Regional Council of Kymenlaakso, the City of 
Kotka, Kotka-Hamina regional development company Cursor Ltd., Kotka Maritime 
Research Association Merikotka and Kotka Maritime Research Centre Corporate 
Group: SE Mäkinen Logistics, OSKE – Maritime Cluster Programme, Steveco, Port of 
Hamina, Port of Helsinki, Port of Kotka, Kristina Cruises, Finnlines, Aker Arctic, CCC 
and Finstaship. 
 
The Centre for Maritime Studies of the University of Turku expresses its gratitude to all 
parties who have contributed to the making of this report. 
 















The increasing shipping activity in the Gulf of Finland has raised concerns about the 
safety of maritime traffic, especially about the possibility of a large oil accident due to 
the increasing oil export activity of Russia in the area. Various international, supra-
national, regional and national policy instruments aim at minimizing the risks of 
accidents and other harmful effects of shipping.  
 
This report is concerned with maritime safety policy instruments: policy instruments in 
general; the central regulatory bodies of maritime safety; the maritime safety policy 
instruments and the future prospects of maritime policy; the effectiveness of policy 
instruments; and the critique of the current maritime safety policy system. The purpose 
of the report is to review the structure and state of the maritime safety policy system 
with focus on the Gulf of Finland. The report is a part of the EU-funded research project 
“SAFGOF - Evaluation of the Traffic Increase in the Gulf of Finland During the years 
2007-2015 and the Effect of the Increase on the Environment and Traffic Chain 
Activities” and the Work Package 6: “Political and social instruments, guidelines and 
economic incentives”. 
 
Policy instruments can be grouped to regulatory, economic and information guidance 
instruments. Maritime safety is enhanced with all these instrument types, although most 
prominently with regulatory instruments. Due to the international character of the 
shipping industry, the regulation of maritime safety is mostly done at international level, 
in the framework of the United Nations and the International Maritime Organization 
IMO. However, the European Union also has maritime safety regulations of its own, 
there are regional arrangements such as HELCOM, and some maritime safety related 
issues are regulated at the national level. 
 
Regulatory maritime safety instruments include regulations on mariners, navigation, the 
surveillance of ship conditions and the construction and equipment of ships. Economic 
instruments include waterway and port dues, marine insurance, P&I clubs, liability and 
compensation questions and incentives. The use of economic instruments to promote 
public maritime safety goals is still in a minor position, but there are some examples 
that have potential for wider use. The problem with economic instruments is that, in 
many cases, they belong to the domain of national regulation, and their implementation 
at regional or international level can be difficult. Information guidance is based on 
voluntary actions and, in addition to the dissemination of information, it can include 
subjects like voluntary training, certification or awards.  
 
It seems that the risks of maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland and in the Baltic Sea are 
taken seriously, and new ways to decrease these risks are developed. New regulations 
are planned or are going to be implemented, especially in the areas of the environmental 
effects of shipping (emissions, anti-fouling substances, alien species etc.) and 
navigational issues (AIS-based systems, electronic charts etc.). It is also often noticed 
that the human factor in maritime safety risks needs more attention, but it seems to be 
 
difficult to find policies effective in minimizing the effects of the human factor in 
maritime accidents and incidents. Training is most often offered as a solution. 
  
According to literature, effective maritime policy instruments should fulfil at least the 
following criteria: 1) effectiveness – the policy instrument must be suitable for 
achieving a desired goal, 2) economic efficiency – the benefits versus the costs of 
implementing the policy instrument should be in balance, 3) acceptability – the policy 
instrument must be accepted by the stakeholders and the community, 4) enforcement – 
the policy instrument can be implemented effectively, 5) lateral effects – the positive 
spill-over effects of the policy instrument in other sectors, 6) incentive and innovation – 
a good policy instrument encourages experimentation and gives incentives for 
improvement.  
 
Due to the increasing number of regulations on maritime safety, the number of maritime 
accidents has decreased during past decades. Most of the regulations have been 
effective in preventing accidents and incidents. Still, accidents and incidents happen at 
sea, and the current regulation system can be criticized on several points. The 
international regulation process is not easy; it tends to be slow and the result can 
become a compromise of compromises. Regulation is mostly reactive instead of 
proactive. The work of IMO is based on the participation of nation states and the 
implementation of regulation by flag states. Nation states are primarily promoting their 
own interests in IMO, and all flag states do not have the same implementation 
standards. The failure of IMO to provide fast responses and to take local circumstances 
into consideration in regulation has led to a situation where, for example, the European 
Union regulates maritime safety, and there are such arrangements as Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Areas.  
 
Many kinds of companies operate in the shipping industry: companies that take safety 
matters seriously and act responsibly, and companies that aim to operate as cheaply as 
possible, not caring about safety measures.  The latter often have very obscure owner 
arrangements and are thus difficult to bring to account if something happens. The 
operation of irresponsible shipping companies is enabled by shippers who take the 
cheapest transport at the expense of safety and by other actors who play ball with such 
companies. The careless attitude to safety can also partly be attributed to the old-
fashioned safety culture of the shipping industry. 
 
When comparing the current maritime safety policy system as a whole with the criteria 
for successful policies, it can be concluded that, in many respects, the current system is 
effective with the greatest problems being in implementation and in cost-effectiveness. 
The nation state based implementation system is not functioning properly, and the 
existence of flags of convenience is the clearest sign of that. The cost-effectiveness of 
policies is hard to calculate, both of single policies and of the policies in comparison 
with each other, which can result in a situation where a policy decreases little risk with 
high costs. 
 
New approaches to shipping policy at the international level, such as multi-level 
governance or polycentric governance systems, have been proposed. Multi-level 
governance means that central government authority is dispersed both vertically, to 
locate at other territorial levels, and horizontally, to non-state actors. Polycentric 
governance systems go one step further; they create a more complex policy-making 
framework, encompassing a variety of policy-generating origins across all types of 
institutions, both private and public (governments, interest groups, political parties, 
commercial companies etc.). International jurisdiction determines the levels, but the 
concrete measures can be decided locally in co-operation with different actors. These 
governance systems may offer a mechanism to reflect the actual activities within the 
maritime sector and the priorities of the stakeholders involved. However, such a change 





Suomenlahden lisääntynyt meriliikenne on herättänyt huolta meriliikenteen 
turvallisuuden tasosta, ja erityisesti Venäjän öljyviennin kasvu on lisännyt 
öljyonnettomuuden todennäköisyyttä Suomenlahdella. Erilaiset kansainväliset, 
alueelliset ja kansalliset ohjauskeinot pyrkivät vähentämään merionnettomuuden riskiä 
ja meriliikenteen muita haittavaikutuksia. 
 
Tämä raportti käsittelee meriturvallisuuden yhteiskunnallisia ohjauskeinoja: 
ohjauskeinoja yleisellä tasolla, meriturvallisuuden keskeisimpiä säätelijöitä, 
meriturvallisuuden ohjauskeinoja ja meriturvallisuuspolitiikan tulevaisuuden näkymiä, 
ohjauskeinojen tehokkuutta ja nykyisen meriturvallisuuden ohjausjärjestelmän 
heikkouksia. Raportti on kirjallisuuskatsaus meriturvallisuuden yhteiskunnalliseen 
sääntelyn rakenteeseen ja tilaan erityisesti Suomenlahden meriliikenteen näkökulmasta. 
Raportti on osa tutkimusprojektia ”SAFGOF - Suomenlahden meriliikenteen 
kasvunäkymät 2007 - 2015 ja kasvun vaikutukset ympäristölle ja kuljetusketjujen 
toimintaan” ja sen työpakettia 6 ”Keskeisimmät riskit ja yhteiskunnalliset 
vaikutuskeinot”. 
 
Yhteiskunnalliset ohjauskeinot voidaan ryhmitellä hallinnollisiin, taloudellisiin ja tieto-
ohjaukseen perustuviin ohjauskeinoihin. Meriturvallisuuden edistämisessä käytetään 
kaikkia näitä, mutta hallinnolliset ohjauskeinot ovat tärkeimmässä asemassa. 
Merenkulun kansainvälisen luonteen vuoksi meriturvallisuuden sääntely tapahtuu 
pääosin kansainvälisellä tasolla YK:n ja erityisesti Kansainvälisen merenkulkujärjestön 
(IMO) toimesta. Lisäksi myös Euroopan Unionilla on omaa meriturvallisuuteen 
liittyvää sääntelyä ja on myös olemassa muita alueellisia meriturvallisuuden 
edistämiseen liittyviä elimiä kuten HELCOM. Joitakin meriturvallisuuden osa-alueita 
säädellään myös kansallisella tasolla. 
 
Hallinnolliset meriturvallisuuden ohjauskeinot sisältävät aluksen rakenteisiin ja 
varustukseen, alusten kunnon valvontaan, merimiehiin ja merityön tekemiseen sekä 
navigointiin liittyviä ohjauskeinoja. Taloudellisiin ohjauskeinoihin kuuluvat esimerkiksi 
väylä- ja satamamaksut, merivakuutukset, P&I klubit, vastuullisuus- ja 
korvauskysymykset sekä taloudelliset kannustimet. Taloudellisten ohjauskeinojen 
käyttö meriturvallisuuden edistämiseen on melko vähäistä verrattuna hallinnollisten 
ohjauskeinojen käyttöön, mutta niitä voitaisiin varmasti käyttää enemmänkin. 
Ongelmana taloudellisten ohjauskeinojen käytössä on se, että ne kuuluvat pitkälti 
kansallisen sääntelyn piiriin, joten alueellisten tai kansainvälisten intressien edistäminen 
taloudellisilla ohjauskeinoilla voi olla hankalaa. Tieto-ohjaus perustuu toimijoiden 
vapaaehtoisuuteen ja yleisen tiedotuksen lisäksi tieto-ohjaukseen sisältyy esimerkiksi 
vapaaehtoinen koulutus, sertifiointi tai meriturvallisuuden edistämiseen tähtäävät 
palkinnot. 
 
Poliittisella tasolla meriliikenteen aiheuttamat turvallisuusriskit Suomenlahdella on 
otettu vakavasti ja paljon työtä tehdään eri tahoilla riskien minimoimiseksi. Uutta 
sääntelyä on odotettavissa etenkin liittyen meriliikenteen ympäristövaikutuksiin ja 
meriliikenteen ohjaukseen kuten meriliikenteen sähköisiin seurantajärjestelmiin. Myös 
inhimilliseen tekijän merkitykseen meriturvallisuuden kehittämisessä on kiinnitetty 
lisääntyvissä määrin huomiota, mutta inhimilliseen tekijän osalta tehokkaiden 
ohjauskeinojen kehittäminen näyttää olevan haasteellista. Yleisimmin lääkkeeksi 
esitetään koulutuksen kehittämistä. 
 
Kirjallisuudessa esitettyjen kriteereiden mukaan tehokkaiden ohjauskeinojen tulisi 
täyttää seuraavat vaatimukset: 1) tarkoituksenmukaisuus – ohjauskeinojen täytyy olla 
sopivia asetetun tavoitteen saavuttamiseen, 2) taloudellinen tehokkuus – ohjauskeinon 
hyödyt vs. kustannukset tulisi olla tasapainossa, 3) hyväksyttävyys – ohjauskeinon 
täytyy olla hyväksyttävä asianosaisten ja myös laajemman yhteiskunnan näkökulmasta 
katsottuna, 4) toimeenpano – ohjauskeinon toimeenpanon pitää olla mahdollista ja sen 
noudattamista täytyy pystyä valvomaan, 5) lateraaliset vaikutukset – hyvällä 
ohjauskeinolla on positiivisia seurannaisvaikutuksia muutoinkin kuin vain ohjauskeinon 
ensisijaisten tavoitteiden saavuttaminen, 6) kannustin ja uuden luominen – hyvä 
ohjauskeino kannustaa kokeilemaan uusia ratkaisuja ja kehittämään toimintaa. 
 
Meriturvallisuutta koskevaa sääntelyä on paljon ja yleisesti ottaen merionnettomuuksien 
lukumäärä on ollut laskeva viime vuosikymmenien aikana. Suuri osa sääntelystä on 
ollut tehokasta ja parantanut turvallisuuden tasoa maailman merillä. Silti 
merionnettomuuksia ja muita vaarallisia tapahtumia sattuu edelleen. Nykyistä 
sääntelyjärjestelmää voidaan kritisoida monen asian suhteen. Kansainvälisen sääntelyn 
aikaansaaminen ei ole helppoa: prosessi on yleensä hidas ja tuloksena voi olla 
kompromissien kompromissi. Kansainvälinen sääntely on yleensä reaktiivista eli 
ongelmakohtiin puututaan vasta kun jokin onnettomuus tapahtuu sen sijaan että se olisi 
proaktiivista ja pyrkisi puuttumaan ongelmakohtiin jo ennen kuin jotain tapahtuu. 
IMO:n työskentely perustuu kansallisvaltioiden osallistumiseen ja sääntelyn 
toimeenpano tapahtuu lippuvaltioiden toimesta. Kansallisvaltiot ajavat IMO:ssa 
pääasiallisesti omia intressejään ja sääntelyn toimeenpanossa on suuria eroja 
lippuvaltioiden välillä. IMO:n kyvyttömyys puuttua havaittuihin ongelmiin nopeasti ja 
ottaa sääntelyssä huomioon paikallisia olosuhteita on johtanut siihen, että esimerkiksi 
Euroopan Unioni on alkanut itse säädellä meriturvallisuutta ja että on olemassa sellaisia 
alueellisia erityisjärjestelyjä kuin PSSA (particularly sensitive sea area – erityisen 
herkkä merialue). 
 
Merenkulkualalla toimii monenlaisia yrityksiä: toisaalta yrityksiä, jotka pyrkivät 
toimimaan turvallisesti ja kehittämään turvallisuutta vielä korkeammalle tasolle, ja 
toisaalta yrityksiä, jotka toimivat niin halvalla kuin mahdollista, eivät välitä 
turvallisuusseikoista, ja joilla usein on monimutkaiset ja epämääräiset omistusolosuhteet 
ja joita vahingon sattuessa on vaikea saada vastuuseen. Ongelma on, että 
kansainvälisellä merenkulkualalla kaikkien yritysten on toimittava samoilla 
markkinoilla. Vastuuttomien yritysten toiminnan mahdollistavat laivaajat ja muut alan 
toimijat, jotka suostuvat tekemään yhteistyötä niiden kanssa. Välinpitämätön 




Verrattaessa meriturvallisuuden sääntelyjärjestelmää kokonaisuutena tehokkaiden 
ohjauskeinoihin kriteereihin, voidaan todeta, että monien kriteerien osalta nykyistä 
järjestelmää voidaan pitää tehokkaana ja onnistuneena. Suurimmat ongelmat lienevät 
sääntelyn toimeenpanossa ja ohjauskeinojen kustannustehokkuudessa. Lippuvaltioiden 
toimeenpanoon perustuva järjestelmä ei toimi toivotulla tavalla, josta mukavuuslippujen 
olemassa olo on selvin merkki. Ohjauskeinojen, sekä yksittäisten ohjauskeinojen että 
vertailtaessa eri ohjauskeinoja keskenään, kustannustehokkuutta on usein vaikea 
arvioida, minkä seurauksena ohjauskeinojen kustannustehokkuudesta ei ole saatavissa 
luotettavaa tietoa ja tuloksena voi olla, että ohjauskeino on käytännössä pienen riskin 
eliminoimista korkealla kustannuksella.  
 
Kansainvälisen tason meriturvallisuus- (ja merenkulku-) politiikan menettelytavoiksi on 
ehdotettu myös muita vaihtoehtoja kuin nykyinen järjestelmä, esimerkiksi monitasoista 
tai polysentristä hallintojärjestelmää. Monitasoisella hallintojärjestelmällä tarkoitetaan 
järjestelmää, jossa keskushallinto on hajautettu sekä vertikaalisesti alueellisille tasoille 
että horisontaalisesti ei-valtiollisille toimijoille. Polysentrinen hallintojärjestelmä menee 
vielä askeleen pidemmälle. Polysentrinen hallintojärjestelmä on hallintotapa, jonka 
puitteissa kaikentyyppiset toimijat, sekä yksityiset että julkiset, voivat osallistua 
hallintoon, siis esimerkiksi hallitukset, edunvalvontajärjestöt, kaupalliset yritykset jne. 
Kansainvälinen lainsäädäntö määrittelee yleiset tasot, mutta konkreettiset toimenpiteet 
voidaan päättää paikallisella tasolla eri toimijoiden välisessä yhteistyössä. Tämän 
tyyppisissä hallintojärjestelmissä merenkulkualan todellinen, kansainvälinen mutta 
toisaalta paikallinen, toimintaympäristö tulisi otetuksi paremmin huomioon kuin 
järjestelmässä, joka perustuu kansallisvaltioiden keskenään yhteistyössä tekemään 
sääntelyyn. Tällainen muutos meriturvallisuuden hallinnassa vaatisi kuitenkin suurta 
periaatteellista suunnanmuutosta, jollaisen toteutumista ei voi pitää kovin 
todennäköisenä ainakaan lyhyellä tähtäimellä.  
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Maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland has grown remarkably during the 2000’s, which 
is mainly due to the strong economic growth and the increasing oil production and 
transportation activities of Russia. It is widely believed that the growth of maritime 
traffic will continue in the Gulf of Finland also in the future. In 2007, about 263 M 
tonnes of cargo with 53 600 ship calls were transported by sea in the Gulf of Finland. 
56% of the cargo was oil. In addition, there is a dense passenger traffic line between 
Helsinki and Tallinn. (Kuronen et al. 2008) 
 
The growth of maritime traffic, and especially of oil transportation, has raised concerns 
about the safety of maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland, which is a narrow, shallow 
and ecologically vulnerable sea area. The Gulf of Finland is a part of the world’s largest 
area of brackish water, the Baltic Sea. The Gulf of Finland is 400 km long and its width 
varies between 60 and 135 km. Three countries surround the Gulf of Finland: Finland, 
Russia and Estonia. The maximum depth is 60 metres and the average depth 37 metres 
(for comparison: the average depth of the Mediterranean Sea is 1 550 metres). The Gulf 
of Finland is partially ice-covered, approximately from December to April. The ice-
cover is the heaviest on the Russian side of the gulf. (Nikula & Tynkkynen 2007) 
 
The increasing shipping activity in the Gulf of Finland creates environmental and safety 
risks, such as the possibility of an oil tanker grounding or colliding – in the worst case 
with a passenger ship. Realization of the risks could have devastating effects on the 
environment and on the commercial and recreational activities at sea. Various 
international, supra-national, regional and national maritime safety policy instruments 
aim at minimizing these risks. 
 
Maritime safety includes the safety of people both on board and ashore and the safety of 
cargo transportation. The environmental effects of shipping are either operational 
discharges (automatic or intentional discharges of oil and other harmful substances, 
ballast water, antifouling substances, garbage and sewage) or accidental discharges, 
which can have harmful effects on the environment (Roberts 2007). Factors affecting 
maritime safety can be grouped into internal and external factors. Internal factors 
include the condition of a ship and its equipment and the competence of the personnel 
on board. External factors consist of the conditions of waterways and maritime safety 
devices, the quality of vessel traffic services, piloting, ice-breaker assistance and 
available information on weather conditions, ice and water level. The supervision of 
compliance with the regulations and compensation and liability questions are also 
important aspects of maritime safety (Ministry of Transport and Communications 
2009a). All these issues are regulated in order to enhance the level of maritime safety. 
 
 
1.1 Contents and background of the study 
 
In this report, maritime safety policy instruments are studied – how the safety and 
environmental safety of shipping is governed and can be governed by policy 
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instruments. The focus of the report is on preventive maritime safety policy instruments 
in the Gulf of Finland. The report presents policy instruments in general and the policy 
instruments, regulatory bodies and the future prospects of maritime safety from the 
point of view of the Gulf of Finland. The weak points of the current system are analyzed 
and evaluated in the light of the criteria for effective policies.  
 
The report has been written as a part of the research project “SAFGOF - Evaluation of 
the traffic increase in the Gulf of Finland during the years 2007 - 2015 and the effect of 
the increase on the environment and traffic chain activities” of Kotka Maritime 
Research Centre (KMRC). This report is one result of the Work Package 6 “Summary: 
political and social instruments, guidelines and economic incentives”. The purpose of 
the report is to review the maritime safety policy instruments in general and in the 
current situation of maritime safety policy in the Gulf of Finland. In connection with the 
theme, a report on oil accidents at sea and how they have affected the development of 
maritime safety legislation has been written in the project (Luoma 2009). 
 
Work Package 6 of the SAFGOF project is conducted by the Centre for Maritime 
Studies of the University of Turku, which has previously conducted two Work Packages 
in the SAFGOF project: WP 1 “Baltic Sea traffic flows” (Kuronen et al. 2008) and WP 
4 “Atmospheric emissions of the increasing maritime traffic” (Kalli & Tapaninen 2008). 
The SAFGOF project has begun on the 1st of January, 2008 and it ends on the 31st of 
December, 2010. The project is financed by the European Union – European Regional 
Development Fund – Regional Council of Kymenlaakso, the City of Kotka, Kotka-
Hamina regional development company Cursor Ltd., Kotka Maritime Research 
Association Merikotka and Kotka Maritime Research Centre Corporate Group. This 
report has been written by researcher Jenni Kuronen with the support of Professor Ulla 
Tapaninen. 
 
The Centre for Maritime Studies is a special unit of the University of Turku and it is one 
of the leading providers of education, research and expert services in the maritime field 
of Finland. In addition to its national activities, the CMS has taken part in numerous 
international projects, especially in the Baltic Sea area. The Kotka office of the Centre 
for Maritime Studies functions as a part of Kotka Maritime Research Centre. The 
KMRC has existed since 2005, and research units from four universities operate in its 
premises: the University of Helsinki, Helsinki University of Technology, the University 
of Turku and Kymenlaakso University of Applied Sciences. 
 
 
1.2 The structure of the report 
 
The report is structured as follows. First, the different policy instruments are presented 
generally (Chapter 2). Policy instruments are divided into three groups: regulatory 
instruments, economic instruments and information guidance instruments. Then, the 
most central regulators of maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland, the existing policy 
instruments of maritime safety and the future prospects of maritime policy are presented 
(Chapters 4 - 5). In the last part of the report some general views and criteria for 
effective policy instruments are studied and the weak points of the current governance 
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system are analyzed (Chapters 6 & 7). At the end, the findings of the report are 
summarized and discussed. 
 
This report is based on written sources in literature and in the Internet. Part of the used 
literature has been literature on environmental policy instruments - partly due to the 
reason that much has been written about environmental policy instruments and, in most 
cases, it is applicable to other policy fields as well, and partly because in the SAFGOF 
research project, the primary focus is on the policy instruments that would reduce the 
accident probability and/or the environmental pollution caused by an oil spill. 
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2 POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
In most cases, the self-regulation of companies or other private actors is not seen to be 
sufficient from the societal point of view, “the common good”, and it has led to a wide 
spectrum of societal control of human activities (Klemmensen et al. 2007). Policy 
instruments aim to change the behaviour of actors towards patterns desired by the 
society. Policy instruments can be categorized into three groups: regulatory control 
(jurisdiction and law based decrees, restrictions, licences etc.), economic control (taxes, 
subsidies, fees etc.) and information guidance (information, voluntary education, 
certification, awards etc.). Policy instruments can also be considered from the viewpoint 
of which interests are to be protected – private goods (the competitiveness of 
companies) or public goods, which the market would otherwise neglect (the 
maintenance of safety in shipping, ensuring safety and security for people and goods 
and protection of the environment from the harmful effects of shipping). Policy 
instruments can be either preventive measures or sanctions and consequences. Both 
preventive measures and consequences can be either private (for example insurances) or 
administrative measures (for example prohibitions). (Figure 2.1) 
  
 
What to protect: Public interests




- Licences and permissions











Preventive measures Subsequent measures Private measures





Figure 2.1  Policy instruments 
 
 




2.1 Regulatory instruments 
 
Regulatory instruments include actions that aim to modify an agent’s behaviour by 
defining or changing the sets of rules. Regulatory instruments include jurisdiction, 
restrictions, licences, permissions and standards (Vieira et al. 2007). Planning systems 
can also be included in regulatory instruments (Ekroos et al. 2002). Regulatory 
instruments are the most widely used policy instruments, also in the maritime world. 
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2.1.1 Jurisdiction and law based decrees 
 
Jurisdiction is actually behind all public regulatory instruments and economic 
instruments – to be legally conclusive, they must be based on jurisdiction. So, in fact, 
regulatory and economic instruments are practical means to carry out juridical goals and 
principles. But there is also a great amount of jurisdiction that solely sets out the rules 
for behaviour, and compliance is controlled by sanctions. 
 
 
2.1.2 Licences and permissions 
 
Licences and permissions represent anticipatory instruments, which require a permit to 
perform something before an action has begun. Authorities set requirements and 
restrictions, which actors have to fulfil before they can have a permit. A licence refers to 
the longer-lasting permit to do something; for example, a ship must have certificates on 
its structure and maintenance, which show that the ship fulfils certain requirements and 
is allowed to ship from one country to another. A permission is a more temporary 
permit to do something, e.g. a permit to ship radioactive cargo. A lighter version of 
licences and permissions is a requirement of notice; for example, a ship has to give a 
departure and arrival notice before it leaves or enters a port. (Ekroos et al. 2002) 
 
 
2.1.3 Prohibitions and restrictions 
 
A prohibition is a comprehensive act to prevent some unwanted action. A restriction is a 
milder version of a prohibition – it means that something is prohibited, for example, at a 
certain time or there are other temporary limitations to normal actions. For example, in 
winter time, the maritime administrations in the Gulf of Finland set winter navigation 
restrictions, which define the minimum ice-classes and DWT for ships entering the area. 
 
 
2.1.4 Planning systems 
 
In environmental policy, land use planning and other land use control systems are 
central regulatory instruments. In shipping, there are corresponding planning systems, 
such as waterway planning, traffic separation schemes and routing. They control the use 
of the sea area for shipping purposes and promote safe shipping. Transport supply 
instruments are also planning systems; they aim to modify and improve the behaviour of 
transport-system agents by changing the quantity and/or quality of the available 
transport infrastructure capacity, equipment or vehicles. In the maritime world this 
could mean the opening up of, for instance, new waterways and ports or new 
information systems to optimize the use of maritime infrastructure capacity and to 
replace traffic from congested sea areas. (Vieira et al. 2007) 
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2.2 Economic instruments  
 
The rationale behind economic instruments is to make unwanted behaviour more 
expensive or wanted behaviour cheaper, so that companies will have economic 
incentive to change their activities in order to avoid extra costs. Economic instruments 
are also used in society to cover the costs of providing infrastructure, such as 
waterways, and to prevent the exploitation of common resources. In addition, there are 
market-based economic instruments, for example emission trading. (Klemmensen et al. 
2007) 
 
The basic problem in economics is that all costs of activity are not included in the prices 
of normal market transactions. These costs are so-called external costs, e.g. for pollution 
or health issues. By using economic instruments and by including external costs in the 
prices, the situation can be changed towards a more desirable way of action. The 
problem with the internalization of external costs into the prices is that often they are 
very difficult to measure in monetary terms. How much is it worth that a bird species is 
harmed by an oil spill or that people living near a port with dense sea and land traffic 
get respiratory organ diseases? Calculations of external costs are often full of 
uncertainties. In practice, deciding the level of taxation or other economic instruments 






Charges are payments that are meant to cover the expenses of certain actions or 
maintenance of the infrastructure of some services, such as the handling of sewage. 





The society collects taxes in order to finance public expenditures. Finland, for example, 
collects a waterway due, which is a tax, and it is meant to cover the expenses of 
waterway maintenance. Taxes can also be used for pursuing other goals, for example 
goals related to social policy or to the competitiveness of private companies. 
Environmental taxes are directed to activities that have a harmful effect on nature. Many 
times, the tax liability is enacted to other than environmental purposes, but the tax can 
still have positive effects from the environmental or safety point of view. (Klemmensen 





If charges and taxes are “sticks”, subsidies are “carrots”. They are used for encouraging 
private actors to behave in a certain way, and they can be either direct or indirect. A 
direct subsidy means that, for example, the state finances a part of the investment or 
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gives a loan at a low interest rate. An indirect subsidy is a reduction of costs, for 
example the reduction of taxes. (Klemmensen et al. 2007)   
 
 
2.3 Information guidance  
 
Information guidance is premised on the idea that justified information makes people, 
communities or companies change their behaviour patterns. Information guidance 
includes, for example, information, training, standardization, certification and awards. 
What is characteristic of information guidance is that it is based on voluntary actions. 
While regulatory or economic instruments are, in most cases, based on legislation and 
there are consequences for non-conformity, the effect of information guidance is totally 
dependent on the voluntary interest of an actor. 
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3 THE REGULATORY BODIES OF MARITIME SAFETY 
 
Because ships can sail around the world between different states, it is appropriate to 
have worldwide regulations on matters like maritime safety in order to avoid a situation 
where each coastal state has its own rules on issues like ship structure, manning etc. 
(Stopford 2009). Thus, maritime safety regulation starts from the international level (the 
UN), but it is done also at supra-national (the EU), national (Finland, Estonia, Russia), 
and regional (the Gulf of Finland) levels (Figure 3.1). In principle, these levels work in 
a so-called nested hierarchy, which means that the international level is the outmost 
circle and other levels are within each other in the circle, and inner circles should 
always be consistent with the outer levels of the circle. Otherwise, the implementation 
of regulation is likely to be ineffectual. (Roe 2008) 
 
 
International: United NationsInternational Maritime Organization IMO
International Labour Organization ILO




Figure 3.1 The main regulatory bodies of maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland 
 
In this chapter, all central regulatory bodies of maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland are 
presented. In addition to these, there are bodies that do not have legislative power, but 
somehow affect maritime safety, for example, environmental organizations like WWF, 
classification societies and marine insurance companies. There are also cases where the 
United States have legislated maritime safety nationally, and it has had an effect on the 
entire shipping industry, for example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (Luoma 2009). 
 
 
3.1 The United Nations – The UNCLOS Convention 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes the most 
fundamental rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources, including the 
movements of ships. The Convention has come into force in 1994. Some of the shipping 
related key points of the Convention are as follows:  
• it defines the boundaries of sea zones  
• coastal states exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea area and they have 
the right to determine its breadth up to a limit of 12 nautical miles  
• foreign vessels are allowed innocent passage through territorial waters  
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• states are obliged to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for 
damage caused by the violation of their international obligations to combat such 
pollution 
• disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to 
the International Court of Justice or to arbitration.  
 
The UNCLOS Convention lists the following areas in which coastal state legislation is 
permitted: the safety of navigation; the protection of navigational aids; the preservation 
of the environment; the prevention, reduction and control of pollution; and the 
prevention of infringement e.g. of customs laws. Coastal states cannot make legislation 
on the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships. The rights of the 
port state are defined by dividing the sea into maritime zones:  
• the territorial sea zone (water closest to the shore, where a coastal state has the 
most extensive rights)  
• the contiguous zone (coastal states have limited powers to enforce customs, 
fiscal, sanitary and immigration laws) 
• the exclusive economic zone (a belt of sea extending up to 200 miles from the 
shore, defines the ownership of resources, coastal states have rights to enforce 
pollution regulation in EEZ areas)  
• high sea zones (sea areas that are not covered by the aforementioned zones). 
(Stopford 2009) 
 
From the point of view of maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland, regulations on the 
territorial sea zones and economic zones have particular significance. The coastal state 
can, for example, demand that vessels in international traffic follow the traffic 
separation schemes and routeing that the coastal state has determined for its territorial 
waters. Particularly vessels with dangerous cargo can be asked to use certain routes. In 
the economic zone and in the high sea zone, vessels are under the jurisdiction of their 
flag state. Because of the narrowness of the Gulf of Finland, the territorial seas of 
Finland and Estonia would reach each other, but the countries have agreed to limit their 
territorial waters so that they do not reach closer than three nautical miles from the 
centre line of the Gulf of Finland. Thus, there is a sea area in the middle of the Gulf of 
Finland where high sea zone rules apply to the ships in international traffic. (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2009a)  
 
All three countries surrounding the Gulf of Finland – Finland, Russian and Estonia – 
have ratified the UNCLOS Convention.  (United Nations 2009) 
 
The United Nations has delegated maritime issues to two UN agencies: International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Labour Organization (ILO) (Chapter 
4.3.3). IMO is the agency responsible for ship safety, pollution and security, and ILO 
for the laws governing maritime personnel. The main instrument of both agencies is 
conventions, which become laws when they are enacted by each member state. IMO 
and ILO also give codes, guidelines or recommended practices on important matters not 
considered suitable for regulation by formal treaty instruments.  
  
 




IMO has 166 member states and its supreme governing body is the Assembly, which 
meets every two years. The Assembly selects the Council, which consists of 32 member 
states. The technical and legal work is carried out by five committees and by numerous 
sub-committees. (Stopford 2009) 
 
The IMO Conventions include both preventive and sanction and consequence 
instruments. The implementation of IMO rules is based on the two different roles of a 
state: “flag state” and “coastal state”. In the role of flag state, the state rules ships 
registered under its flag regardless of where the ship is in the world. The coastal state, 
also known as port state, enforces maritime laws on the ships that are in its territorial 
waters. (Stopford 2009)  
 
Currently IMO has a total 29 conventions.  
 






(of world fleet) 
Ratification in 
the Gulf of 
Finland 2 
LL International Convention on 
Load Lines 
1968 99 Finland, 
Russia, 
Estonia 
COLREG Convention on the International 
Regulations for the Prevention of 
Collisions at Sea 
1977 98 Finland, 
Russia, 
Estonia 
SOLAS International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea 
1980 99 Finland, 
Russia, 
Estonia 
MARPOL  International Convention for the 












































                                                 
1 The list is not comprehensive but includes the conventions that are mentioned in this report. 
2 In July 2009. 
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STCW International Convention on 
Standards of Training, 
Certification, and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers 
1984 99 Finland, 
Russia, 
Estonia 
 International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Co-Operation 
1995 67 Finland, 
Estonia 
CLC International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage 
1996 96 Finland, 
Russia, 
Estonia 
LLMC Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims 
1996 35 Finland, 
Russia 
FUND International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage 





3.2.1 The Baltic Sea - Particularly Sensitive Sea Area PSSA 
 
In the past decades, it was perceived in IMO that, besides international regulation, there 
was need for a system that would also take local circumstances into consideration. As a 
solution to this problem, IMO developed the concept of PSSA, “Particularly Sensitive 
Sea Area”, in order to protect ecologically sensitive sea areas from the hazards of 
shipping (Resolution A.982(24): Revised guidelines for the identification and 
designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas). To be identified as PSSA, the 
following elements must be present in the sea area: 1) the area must meet at least one of 
the three criteria: a) ecological, b) social, cultural and economic, c) scientific and 
educational value, 2) it must be vulnerable to damage caused by shipping activity, 3) 
there must be measures that can be taken by IMO to provide protection to the area. 
PSSA status provides international recognition of the special significance of a sea area, 
and informs mariners of the importance of taking extra care when navigating in that sea 
area. It gives coastal states the opportunity to take additional protective measures to 
minimize the risks caused by shipping. The designation of a PSSA is not a regulation in 
its own right, but it serves as a basis for the proposal for additional protective measures 
(APMs). The PSSA concept is created by a non-binding IMO Assembly resolution, and 
it is not set forth in a convention. It sets out the problem that PSSA does not have the 
precise legal basis in existing international instruments, and the legal validity of 
measures given on the basis of PSSA status is rather unclear. (Roberts 2007) 
 
APMs given on the basis of PSSA status can include routeing systems for ships (traffic 
separation schemes, areas to be avoided, no anchoring areas, inshore traffic zones, deep 
water routes, precautionary areas, recommended routes), ship reporting systems, and 
discharge and emission control restrictions. (Mäkinen 2008) 
 
                                                 
3 The latest version, which has the ratification of over 90% of the world fleet. 
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At the moment, 12 sea areas have PSSA Status (IMO 2009c). The Baltic Sea has had 
PSSA status since 2005. So far, PSSA associated protective measures in the Baltic Sea 
have been mandatory reporting, a transit route, a deepwater route, fifteen traffic-
separation schemes, localized compulsory pilotage, a deepwater route between existing 
TSS, and two areas to be avoided (recommendation) (Roberts 2007). In the application 
phase, more ambitious proposals were made on possible measures, such as 1) ship 
construction must meet certain standards, so that low quality ships can be excluded 
from the Baltic Sea, 2) crews must have adequate skills and training, 3) the shipping 
industry must assume financial responsibility for the impacts of its activities. Some of 
the participants in the application process held unrealistic expectations and 
misconceptions of the PSSA concept, thinking of it as a “magic cure”. In reality, such 
APMs as a proposal for crew certification and a ban on single-hulled tankers are out of 
the question in the context of the PSSA status. (Uggla 2007) However, single-hulled 
tankers will be banned by 2010 on the basis of the MARPOL Convention and EU 
legislation (Luoma 2009).  
 
The Baltic Sea is also a special area by definition of the MARPOL Convention, which 
means that the emitting of oil and oil-bearing mixtures into the sea is completely 
prohibited (Karvonen et al. 2006). 
 
 
3.3 The European Union  
 
In the past, the starting point in the European Union was that maritime safety matters 
should be negotiated at an international level, and the EU did not engage itself in this 
policy area. In the early 1990s, the maritime policy output of the EU was restricted to 
recommendations for the implementation of international rules. However, after some 
maritime accidents in European waters (e.g. the capsizing of Herald of Free Enterprise), 
maritime safety issues were added to the agenda of the EU. The publication of the 
maritime strategy in 1996 marked the transformation of maritime safety into one of the 
four pillars of maritime politics – the other three being the maintenance of the open 
market, the enhancement of the EU shipping sector competitiveness and the 
development of the EU rules regarding state aid to the sector. (Pallis 2006) 
 
The shift in policy legitimacy from the international level to the EU was promoted by 
structural changes in both the supply and demand sides of the shipping market, e.g. the 
flagging-out of ships, the struggle of traditional maritime nations to maintain their 
market share through the relaxation of taxation and crew nationality requirements, the 
establishment of multi-national companies, and the increase of low cost labour from 
developing countries. These changes contributed to the depersonalization and 
reorganization of ship-owning, as well as the increase of asset players who speculate in 
the market. This led to the inflation of the safety problems and increased the 
opportunities for ship-owners to avoid specific regulatory frameworks. All of these 
factors contributed to the possibility for the EU institutions to put forward common 
policy responses. The EU policy making also benefited from the public attention on 
maritime incidents and their consequences on people and the environment. There were 
member states who opposed the development of the common EU maritime safety 
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policy, but the European Union and its institutions (most notably the Commission) 
succeeded in negotiating and modifying its draft proposals, so that they became 
acceptable and in bringing together under a common policy agenda a wide spectrum of 
sea-related industrial, regional and social interests. (Pallis 2006) For example, after the 
accident of oil tanker Erika, the European Union tightened the timetable for the 
abolition of single-hull tankers. The European Union also established the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in 2000 (Karvonen et al. 2006).  
 
The European Union shipping policies are implemented through national legislation of 
the member states and applied through regional and local regulations (Roe 2008). At the 
moment, there are over 40 Community regulations on maritime safety. National 
authority has shifted to the European Union in maritime issues where Community 
legislation exists. In such matters, the EU member countries are obliged to follow the 
Community opinion in IMO, and also, in other maritime issues, there is an obligation to 
coordinate the opinions of the member states in regard to IMO (Ministry of Transport 
and Communications 2009a). The European Union has attempted to gain full 
membership in IMO and present all EU countries with one voice, which is thought to be 
more effective than individual state representations in IMO. This would mean a step 
where the hierarchy in the international jurisdiction of shipping based on state 
representation would be changed, and the influence of states would be reduced. (Roe 
2009) 
 
Maritime affairs are dealt with within the European Union as follows: the European 
council – Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council (TTE), which is formed 
by the ministers of transportation; the European Parliament – the Standing committee of 
Transport and Tourism, the European Commission – the Directorate-General for Energy 
and Transport and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). EMSA’s role is to 
assist the Commission and the member states in the implementation of maritime safety 
legislation and to act as a forum for co-operation between the European Union members 
and institutions. EMSA also maintains related data systems (e.g. SafeSeaNet). (Ministry 
of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
In addition to legislative actions in shipping policy, the European Union attempts to 
create comprehensive policies on the use of seas. It has launched the Integrated 
Maritime Policy (green paper COM (2006) 275; communication COM (2007) 575), and 
the European Commission has given communication for the European Union’s strategy 





The Helsinki Commission’s (HELCOM) aim is to protect the marine environment in the 
Baltic Sea, and it also deals with pollution from maritime traffic. The work of 
HELCOM is founded on the Helsinki Convention of 1992, of which the coastal states of 
the Baltic Sea are the members. HELCOM’s work is guided by declarations and 
strategies approved in ministerial meetings. HELCOM gives recommendations for 
member states to implement, although they are not legally obliged to do so. In practice, 
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member states usually follow the recommendations (Karvonen et al. 2006). In the 
Helsinki Convention, the following issues are defined to be the needed actions to 
prevent pollution from ships:  
• co-operation with IMO 
• realization of systematic hydrographical surveying in the main waterways 
• the development of electric navigation charts (ENC) 
• the approval of the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) 
to replace paper navigation charts 
• the maintenance of a database for AIS information 
• port state controls 
• the harmonization of accident investigation procedures 
• the planning of refuges for ships in emergency state. (Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 2009a) 
 
In recent years, HELCOM has given several recommendations in relation to maritime 
safety and pollution from ships (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a). 
 
 
3.5 The national level 
 
The national policy level focuses on the implementation of the policies agreed at 
international and/or supra-national levels (Roe 2008). Whenever possible, states also 
use the chance to adapt regulations in relation to their own interests and circumstances 
or give national regulations as well (Karvonen et al. 2006). Piloting, vessel traffic 
services, the maintenance of waterways and safety devices, nautical charting and 
weather, water level and ice services are issues that are usually governed nationally 





Maritime safety issues in Finland belong to the sphere of authority of the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications, which is responsible for maritime policy in 
Finland, drafting maritime legislation and contributing to any legislative drafting at the 
EU level. The Transport Services Unit of the Ministry deals with matters concerning the 
safety of waterborne traffic, aids to maritime transport, legal issues concerning shipping 
and maritime environmental legislation. The Ministry’s administrative sector in 
shipping comprises of the Finnish Maritime Administration, Shipping Enterprise 
Finstaship and State Pilotage Enterprise Finnpilot. The Finnish Maritime 
Administration carries out most of the duties concerning maritime safety. In 
environmental matters administration is dispersed: Environmental administration also 
has duties related to maritime environmental issues, such as oil combating.  
 
From 2010 onwards, the government of the transport sector is going to be rearranged, so 
that all the modes of transport are combined into two agencies: the transport safety 
agency and the transport infrastructure agency. For maritime affairs, this means that 
most maritime safety issues will be dealt with in the transport safety agency and other 
Maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland – review on policy instruments   29 
maritime issues (such as cartography and waterway maintenance) in the transport 
infrastructure agency. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009b)  
 
 
3.5.2 Russia  
 
In Russia, maritime safety issues are mainly dealt with in the Morskaya Kollegiya 
[Maritime Collegial Body], which works under the Government of Russian Federation 
and Ministry of Transport. Co-operation with Russia in the Baltic Sea area is a 
challenge, because Russia is the only country that is not a member of the EU, although 





In Estonia, the main authorities are the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications and the Estonian Maritime Administration, which operates within the 
government of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. The duties of 
the Estonian Maritime Administration are to ensure safe navigation in the Estonian 
territorial and inland waters by, for example, performing flag state implementation and 
port state control activities, issuing the certificates of competency for seafarers, carrying 
out the maintenance of aids to navigation, performing hydrographical surveys and 
cartography, arranging icebreaker services, investigating marine casualties and keeping 
ship register (Estonian Maritime Administration 2009; Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communications 2009). 
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4 MARITIME SAFETY POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
 
Factors affecting maritime safety can be grouped to internal and external factors. 
Internal factors include the condition of a ship and its equipment and the competence of 
personnel on board. External factors consist of the conditions of waterways and 
maritime safety devices, the quality of vessel traffic services, piloting, icebreaker 
assistance and available information on the conditions of weather, ice and water level. 
The supervision of compliance with regulations and compensation and liability 
questions are also important aspects in maritime safety (Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 2009a). All these issues are regulated in order to enhance the maritime 
safety level. 
 
In this chapter, the current maritime safety policy instruments are presented. First, 
issues that are governed with regulatory instruments are looked through and 
summarized. Regulatory instruments in maritime safety have been categorized into four 
groups: ship construction and equipment, surveillance of ship conditions, mariners & 
management and navigation. After that, economic instruments and information 
guidance instruments are presented. Also, SAR and other “after accident” policies are 
viewed shortly at the end of the chapter. Here, the purpose is not to present all details of 
the regulations, but to look at how different kinds of policy instruments are used for 
enhancing maritime safety. 
 
 
4.1 Regulations on the construction and equipment of ships 
 
An unsound ship is undoubtedly a threat to maritime safety. In order to avoid the 
shipping of such ships, the structure of ships is regulated, most prominently by IMO and 
the SOLAS convention. Regulations on the structure of ships include the following 
aspects: 





• handling and nature of the cargo carried. 
 
The main objective of SOLAS is to specify minimum standards for the construction, 
equipment and operation of ships. The SOLAS convention covers a wide range of 
measures to improve the safety and security of shipping, such as construction, fire 
protection, life-saving appliances, radio communications, safety of navigation, carriage 
of cargo, management for the safe operation of ships (the ISM code) and maritime 
security (the ISPS code). Flag states are responsible for ensuring that ships under their 
flag comply with these requirements, which are proofed by a number of certificates 
(Roberts 2007). Also, the International Convention on Load Lines and the MARPOL 
Convention are central when looking at regulations on ship construction. (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2009a) 
Maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland – review on policy instruments   31 
 
The ice-going features of a ship are outside the international regulations but central 
from the point of view of the Gulf of Finland. Finland has given national regulations on 
ice classes, which are based on the ice class rules. Ice class rules are made in co-
operation with the Swedish maritime authorities. Also, international classification 
societies have participated in the drafting of ice class rules and have included them in 
their own rules. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
 
4.2 The surveillance of ship conditions  
 
In order to make sure that ships are complying with the regulations on ship structure and 
condition and that they can ship safely, there are several supervision systems in the 
shipping industry: 
• flag state control 
• port state control - PARIS MOU and equivalents  
• classification societies 
• vetting inspections. 
 
If it is perceived that a ship does not comply with the regulations, it can lead to the 
following consequences:  
• request to correct faults 
• certifications of inspection, compliance and related documents can be rejected, 
cancelled or not be renewed 
• intensified control 
• detention of a ship 
• prevention of a ship from entering a port 
• setting a conditional imposition of a fine. 
 
 
4.2.1 Flag state control 
 
Flag State Control is one of the basic premises of the IMO conventions. It means that 
the state where a ship is registered is responsible for supervising that the ship fulfils the 
requirements of those IMO Conventions that the state has ratified. The UNCLOS 
Convention gives the right for any state to register ships, in so far as there is a link 
between the ship and the state. In practice, the state can define the nature of this link, 
and so it can register any vessel it chooses. (Stopford 2009) Countries without any 
maritime experience and expertise can also establish ship registers (Mitroussi 2004). 
Some flags are called flags of convenience or open registries. They usually have lighter 
taxation and less regulation on employment conditions and little supervision on the 
conditions of ships sailing under their flag. Ship-owners register their ships as flags of 
convenience in order to reduce their costs. Nevertheless, all ships sailing under flags of 
convenience are not sub-standard or operated badly. 
 
Ship surveys are performed by national maritime authorities before a ship is put into 
traffic, and renewal, periodical, intermediate, annual and additional surveys are carried 
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out by virtue of the legislation on ship surveys, for example, a date of renewal and 
periodical survey is dependent on ship type and type of traffic. Surveys can also be 
performed by other actors, mainly by classification societies, if they are authorized by 
national authorities. (Decree on Ship Surveys 1123/1999) 
 
 
4.2.2 Port state control 
 
Port state control is a complementary instrument to flag state control, and it has been 
born due to the fact that flag states have different standards in flag state control, and 
some allow the operation of sub-standard ships (Karvonen et al. 2006). IMO has 
adopted a resolution on port state control inspections to identify deficiencies in a ship, 
its equipment or its crew. These procedures are not mandatory, but many countries have 
followed them, e.g. Paris MOU states. Ships with serious deficiencies are detained, and 
a ship can also be banned. The ships inspected are often selected using statistical 
methods to identify high-risk vessels, e.g. on the basis of ship age, flag and ship type. 
(Stopford 2009) Inspections are performed by national maritime authorities or other 
actors authorized by the national authority. 
 
The port state control system has added to the transparency of the maritime safety 
system. Through flag states, it has been impossible to have information on the 
performance of the flag state control system. Port state control information is publicly 
available on the Internet, where anyone can see the safety levels of the flag states, for 
example via http://www.parismou.org. (Karvonen et al. 2006) 
 
Ro-Ro-passenger ships and high speed crafts are also controlled by the host state control 
system, which means that these kinds of ships, which are in regular traffic between 
nations, are controlled by a host state. The host state control system is based on the EU 
Directive (99/35/EY).  
 
 
4.2.3 The Paris MOU and equivalents 
 
The port state control movement began from eight European states located around the 
North Sea, which agreed to inspect foreign ships visiting their ports and to share 
information on the deficiencies of those ships. In 1982, the co-operation was formalized 
in the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), in which 14 European states 
agreed to work together to ensure that ships visiting their ports comply with 
international conventions on safety and pollution. By 2007, the Paris MOU was 
undersigned by 27 countries, including Finland, Estonia and Russia (Paris MOU 2009). 
Each country inspects 25% of the foreign merchant ships visiting its ports. Additional 
port state control MOUs have been established around the Mediterranean (10 
participators), The Tokyo MOU (18 participators), the Caribbean (11 participators), the 
Latin America (12 participators), and the Indian Ocean (11 participators). The United 
States has its own control programme. (Stopford 2009) 
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4.2.4 Classification societies 
 
Classification societies are the shipping industry’s own system for regulating the 
technical and operational standards of ships (in other words, they guarantee that a vessel 
is properly constructed and in good condition), and historically they have arisen from 
the need for insurers to make sure that vessels they were insuring were sound. 
Nowadays, the role of classification societies is more extensive than just acting for the 
needs of insurers. They also serve flag states under the terms of international 
conventions and national regulations. Classification societies work as technical advisers 
to the maritime regulators and assist the regulators in making and implementing 
maritime laws. They also develop technical standards and grant the classification 
certificate required by insurance underwriters. Classification societies class ships 
according to their rules, carry out certification connected with international conventions, 
codes and protocols, and offer a range of quality assurance, engineering and consultancy 
services. Still, classification societies have no legal power, although they might act as 
government representatives, the most common authorizations being tonnage 
measurement and load lines, or SOLAS, MARPOL and IMO setting standards on the 
transportation of dangerous goods. Most major maritime nations have a classification 
society and, altogether, there are more than 50 classification societies operating world-
wide. The 10 largest societies (e.g. Lloyds Register, Det Norske Veritas, Nippon Kaiji 
Kyokai, American Bureau of Shipping, Germanischer Lloyd, and Russian Register) 
cover over 90% of the cargo and passenger fleet in the world. (Boisson 1994; Stopford 
2009) 
 
The problem with classification societies is that they are private companies and are thus 
financed by selling their services. This means that there is intense competition between 
classification societies to attract clients, which can lead to a situation where one society 
classes vessels that have been previously denied of class by another society. The 
process of class transfers has been criticized for being too lax in enabling unscrupulous 
ship-owners to engage in “class shopping” to obtain a particular advantage offered by a 
particular society, or to avoid a special survey made by some other society. To tackle 
this problem, there is the International Association of Classification Societies (since 
1968) which has two aims: to introduce uniformity into the rules of the classification 
societies and to collaborate between class societies. IACS has consultative status in 
IMO. (Boisson 1994; Stopford 2009) 
 
Boisson (1994) has concluded that, in order to tackle the problems of classification 
societies, the following changes are needed: 1) restoring the credibility of classification 
societies, which requires, for example, uniformity of the rules of different classification 
societies and prevention of the class-shopping phenomena, 2) integrating human factors 
by paying more attention to the compliance with the ISM Code or the STCW 
convention, and 3) returning to basics by supplying ship ratings – in other words giving 
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4.2.5 Vetting inspections 
 
Among some charterers, there have been doubts about the performance of either flag or 
port state control or classification societies, and they have chosen to rely on their own 
surveyors to assess the quality of ships, especially in the oil industry. The mistrust 
began to appear in 1980’s after some major accidents. Oil companies claimed that 
existing inspection systems were unable to detect serious deteriorations in the hull of a 
ship. In the initial vetting inspections, Shell found 20% of their oil fleet to be sub-
standard, BP 30% and Mobil 35%. (Boisson 1994)  
 
Besides oil tankers, vetting inspections are performed on chemical and bulk tankers. 
They are mostly performed on behalf of cargo owners, like oil majors, but (Knapp & 
Franses 2007) ship-owners may also ask for the inspection to prove that their vessel 
meets the required quality level (Knapp & Franses 2006). Ship-owners have a strong 
commercial incentive to comply with the requirements of the vetting inspection, 
because the outcome of the inspection determines whether the ship can get cargo. 
(Knapp & Franses 2007) 
 
The Ship Inspection Report Program (SIRE) was introduced by the Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF). It was launched in 1993, and it is a tanker risk 
assessment tool originating from cargo owners (Knapp & Franses 2007; OCIMF 2009). 
Inspections are performed mainly on oil tankers and normally take 8 to 10 hours. 
OCIMF appoints the inspectors (Knapp & Franses 2006). Inspections are based on a 
standardized questionnaire of shipboard operations (Knapp & Franses 2009). After the 
inspection, ship-owners have time to comment on the report before it becomes available 
online. Parts of the inspection results can be seen by other OCIMF members for a fee 
(Knapp & Franses 2006). Different governmental bodies, like port state control 
authorities, have access to SIRE and to the inspection reports for free. The SIRE system 
is a very large database, and it has received altogether over 160,000 inspection reports. 
SIRE has helped the tanker industry to increase its awareness of the importance of 
meeting ship safety standards. OCIMF believes that “better informed vetting decisions 
are leading to improvements in the quality of ships”. (OCIMF 2009) In addition to this, 
oil majors have their own additional requirements besides the basic SIRE requirements, 
and they do not publish the result of the additional requirements in the SIRE report 
(Knapp & Frances 2007).  
 
Rightship is a ship vetting service that ranks vessels from 1 to 5 stars. It combines 
information received through vetting inspections, port state control, casualties, ship 
particular and ship-owner information to rank vessels (Knapp & Franses 2007). Rio 
Tinto Shipping and BHB-Billiton Freight Trading and Logistics founded Rightship in 
2001. Rightship’s aim is to make sure that vessels meet the given standards (Rio Tinto 
2009). The Rightship system is mainly for dry bulk carriers but also for tankers (Knapp 
& Franses 2007). Physical inspections are performed when it seems that the vessel is in 
a higher risk class (Rightship 2009). Inspections can take up to 48 hours (Knapp & 
Franses 2007).  
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Green award inspections originate from the non-profit Green Award Foundation. 
Inspections are performed on oil tankers and bulk carriers and paid by ship-owners. The 
inspections cover all aspects of shipboard operations. If the vessel fulfils the 
requirements, it will get a certificate entitling the ship-owner to have discounts on port 
dues from ports participating in the program. Inspections have to be performed from 
time to time to keep the vessel certified. (Knapp & Franses 2007) 
 
 
4.2.6 About inspection systems in the shipping industry 
 
According to Knapp & Franses (2007), the inspection system, overall, is successful in 
eliminating sub-standard ships, despite some obvious problems in the system. There is a 
lack of trust in the industry that has led to numerous inspections performed by flag 
states, port states, classification societies, insurance companies, P&I Clubs and cargo 
owners in order to determine the real condition of the ships (Boisson 1994; Knapp & 
Franses 2007). In a survey made by Knapp and Franses (2007), total estimated yearly 
inspection costs per tanker are 47,166 dollars, and the estimated yearly frequency of 
inspections for tankers is 11 inspections. The problem with the current inspection 
system is that none of the vetting inspection regimes, or port state control, recognize 
inspections performed by another regime. Now, too many different inspections can 
increase the working hours of the crew and possibly offset the positive impact of the 
inspection. It adds to the costs of the industry, and there do not seem to be significant 
differences in the effects of all these inspections in preventing casualties, although there 
are some differences between different inspections. For example, some industry 
inspections, like Rightship and the Green award, spend more time interviewing crew 
members and pay more attention to ship operations than other inspections. (Knapp & 
Franses 2007) 
 
One solution to the problem could be an information system that combined data on all 
inspections and casualties. This data could be used to improve risk profiling and to shift 
the inspection efforts to the ships and regions where they are needed most. (Knapp & 
Franses 2007) However, initiatives to establish such a system have faced several 
obstacles in IMO. There would have to be measures to ensure that surveyors have 
worked to common standards, and some provision would be needed to protect 
confidential information, for example, between classification societies and their 
customers, in order to avoid the risk of legal action if wrong information was issued to 
the system. (Boisson 1994)  
 
From the point of view of minimizing the risks of an oil accident, it should also be 
noticed that other ship types, such as general cargo, bulk and container ships can carry 
great volumes of bunker fuel, large container ships even more than small tankers, and 
they often have lower safety standards than tankers. (Eide et al. 2007) Attention should 
not only be paid to tankers and ignore other ship types when trying to minimize oil 
accident risks. It can be discussed whether it is good that oil tankers need to bear higher 
safety costs because of higher safety standards, when other shipping sectors can cause 
oil accidents as well.  
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4.3 Mariners and management 
 
From the point of view of maritime safety, it does not matter how good a ship is, if it is 
badly operated by people. Besides the national implementation of international 
regulations on the matter, flag states also play a crucial role in the sense that they can 




4.3.1 IMO regulations 
 
The manning of a ship and the training of seafarers is regulated by the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW). Each ship belonging to the sphere of the Convention must have a Manning 
Certificate, which rules how much crew a ship must have and what kind of an education 
is required of them. The manning is decided on the basis of ship size, type and traffic 
area. Seafarers must also have a medical certificate to prove their health is good enough 
for seaman work. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
IMO has also given several guidelines and resolutions connected to the human factor at 
sea. For example, Resolution on Fatigue Factors in Manning and Safety A.772 (18) 
aims at the recognition of factors causing fatigue, and its goal is to broaden the 
knowledge on fatigue factors and to encourage shipping companies to take fatigue 




4.3.2 The ISM Code 
 
The ISM (International Safety Management) Code, which requires a ship to have a 
safety management system, was included in the SOLAS Convention in 1994. The 
foundation for ISM was laid in the late 1980’s, when numerous fatal accidents 
happened at sea; for example, the capsizing of Herald of Free Enterprise awoke 
concerns about the maritime safety culture. The roots of human error were seen to stem 
from the lack of a comprehensive management system in relation to safety management 
in shipping. The ISM Code requires that a company provide safe practices in ship 
operation and a safe working environment and establish safeguards against all identified 
risks. The ISM Code also entails the idea that companies should continuously improve 
safety. (Lappalainen 2008) 
 
National authorities issue a Document of Compliance to a company that has 
implemented a safety management system in compliance with the requirements of the 
ISM Code. The Safety Management Certificate is issued to ships compliant with the 
ISM Code. Before the issuance of the Document of Compliance and the Safety 
Management Certificate, audits are carried out in the company and on board ships in 
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order to control the conformity of the safety management system. Audits are performed 




4.3.3 ILO regulations 
 
ILO (International Labour Organization) addresses issues related to the welfare of 
seafarers. By the end of 1900’s, ILO had developed numerous maritime labour 
conventions and recommendations dealing with working and living conditions at sea, 
e.g. manning, hours of work, pensions, vacation, sick pay and minimum wages. It 
started to become apparent that this system of conventions was too complex. In 2006 
ILO adopted a new comprehensive Maritime Labour Convention, which will come into 
force when it has been ratified by 30 ILO members with a total share of at least 33% of 
the world gross tonnage. (Stopford 2009) 
 
 
4.4 Navigational instruments 
 
Navigational instruments are developed to prevent accidents at sea, such as groundings 
or collisions. Navigational instruments are preventive in nature, and they include, for 
example, speed limits, sea-lanes, routeing of ships, ship reporting systems and Vessel 
Traffic Services (VTS). Internationally, navigational standards are embodied in the 
Convention on the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG), SOLAS and related IMO guidelines. (Roberts 2007) 
 
Chapter V of the SOLAS Convention (Safety of Navigation) identifies certain 
navigational safety services that should be provided by contracting governments and 
sets forth provisions of an operational nature applicable in general to all ships on all 
voyages. The subjects covered include the maintenance of meteorological services for 
ships, the ice patrol service and the routeing of ships. In the Convention, IMO is 
recognized as the only international body for establishing and adopting routeing 
measures on an international basis. However, the coastal states can establish 
environmentally targeted routeing measures in their own territorial seas in order to 
protect vulnerable areas, but they need to take into account the recommendations of 
IMO in respect to the design and adoption of routeing systems of ships (Roberts 2007). 
Coastal states can, in co-operation, also establish obligatory ship reporting and traffic 
separation schemes in international waters. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 
2009a) 
 
An important tool in navigational aids is the Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
which gives real-time data about the ships and their movements. AIS is obligatory for 
all ships with gross the tonnage of at least 300 (IMO regulation). The AIS system is 
based on VHF radio apparatus that automatically sends two kinds of information: static 
(e.g. the ships identity, destination and cargo) and dynamic (e.g. speed, position and 
heading). It also receives information from other ships. AIS data is used by national 
authorities (such as VTS centres or coast guards) to perform their duties and by 
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international authorities (e.g. HELCOM and EU) on the basis of international 
conventions. (Finnish Maritime Administration 2009a) 
 
 
4.4.1 VTS - Vessel Traffic Services 
 
The SOLAS Convention requires contracting states to maintain Vessel Traffic Services, 
if it is necessary on the basis of the amount of ship traffic and ship traffic related risks. 
Vessel Traffic Services aim to improve the safety and effectiveness of ship traffic. In 
the VTS centres, the sea traffic situation is followed in real time based on information 
transmitted by AIS, radars, cameras and VHF radios. The VTS centres inform ships of 
the traffic situation, the conditions of waterways and safety devices and other issues 
concerning the safety of navigation in the area. The VTS centres can also organize 
traffic with takeoff permissions and staggering methods and even temporarily command 
a traffic area to be closed, command ships to anchor, to return to a port or give speed 
limits, if there are exceptional circumstances, for example because of the weather, ice 
conditions, special transport or some other matter threatening maritime safety. (Finnish 
Maritime Administration 2009b; Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
VTS centres in Finland, Estonia and Russia have slightly different functions, especially 
concerning the organization of search and rescue services and pilotage services 
(Estonian Maritime Administration 2009b; Norfes 2009). 
 
Studies indicate that the risk-reducing effect of a VTS centre is between 20% and 80%, 
depending on the geography, the traffic density and the resources available to the VTS 
(Eide et al. 2007). The effectiveness of VTS centres is also dependent on such matters 
as the co-operation with VTS and piloting, responsibility issues and the control of VTS 
operations. In Finland, there has been criticism that there is legislative unclarity in the 
jurisdiction relations of such matters (Karvonen et al. 2006; Kotiranta 2008).  
 
In the Gulf of Finland, there is one VTS centre in Helsinki in Finland, in Estonia one in 
Tallinn and in Russia one in St. Petersburg. In Russia, VTS centres are organized into 
the following categories: ports (water areas of ports), river (internal waterways) and 
coastal VTS (Norfes 2009).  
 
 
4.4.2 Ship reporting systems 
 
In the international waters of the Gulf of Finland, Russia, Finland and Estonia have 
agreed on a Mandatory Ship Reporting System (GOFREP), which has IMO approval. 
GOFREP was introduced to the Gulf of Finland on the 1st of July, 2004. When arriving 
at the GOFREP area, ships heading to the east report to the Tallinn VTS centre and 
ships heading to the west to the Helsinki VTS centre. The GOFREP area is divided so 
that the southern part is supervised by Estonia, the northern part by Finland and the 
bottom of the Gulf of Finland by Russia. Ships are supervised with the help of the AIS 
system, and they are given information on safety related issues. If a ship is breaking the 
rules of the GOFREP system, the GOFREP authorities make an announcement to the 
flag state, which can put the master in charge. During 2005–2008, the amount of 
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misconducts in the GOFREP system diminished remarkably. In the first half of 2008, 
there were 13 misconducts, which were mostly misconducts in the routing system. 
(Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
Ship traffic and the cargo the ships are carrying are also followed with electrical 
systems. The European Union has developed the SafeSeaNet system, where information 
on ship movements and on dangerous cargoes is gathered. The EU member states are 
responsible for sending information on all ships visiting their ports. In Finland, 
information sharing on the SafeSeaNet is carried out with the national maritime traffic 
data system Portnet, which is compatible with the SafeSeaNet system. (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
 
4.4.3 Traffic separation schemes and routing 
 
Traffic separation schemes are purposed to guide ships to the lanes so that ships can 
anticipate the movements of other ships. According to the SOLAS Convention, IMO 
can ratify traffic separation schemes for international waters on the basis of applications 
of coastal states. In some sea areas, there are special lanes – the so-called DW routes – 
for ships with large depth. In such lanes, smaller ships are obliged to give way to large 
ships, usually tankers. In the Gulf of Finland, there are six traffic separation schemes 




4.4.4 Traffic recommendations and restrictions  
 
In order to secure safe shipping in the Gulf of Finland all year round, Finland, Russia 
and Estonia organize ice-breaking assistance services. Ice-breaking assistance is not 
covered by international regulations, except that SOLAS obliges to give information on 
ice conditions for ships. In wintertime, states also impose traffic restrictions based on 
DWT and ice class. During ice conditions, ships can also be routed to sea areas with 
easier ice conditions. The Baltic States have established an Internet service 
(www.baltice.org), where comprehensive information on ice conditions, ice-breaker 
assistance, traffic restrictions and ice-training can be obtained. (Ministry of Transport 
and Communications 2009a)  
 
Traffic recommendations and restrictions can also be set in other situations, if the 





Piloting is connected with the manoeuvring of a ship, where a pilot guides the ship 
master as an expert of a specific water area and shipping. Piloting is advisory in nature 
and the master of the ship decides whether a ship follows the recommendations of a 
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pilot. Piloting is regulated nationally and there are no international conventions or 
regulations on pilotage.  
 
In Finland, piloting is regulated by the Pilotage Act 940/2003, and the state owned 
company Finnpilot offers the piloting services. In the territorial waters of Finland, the 
use of a pilot is obligatory for all ships with a length of over 60 m, a breadth of over 10 
m, or which carry dangerous cargo, or when the summer draught is over 4.5 m. Upon 
application, the Finnish Maritime Administration can grant a Pilotage Exemption 
Certificate, for a specific waterway and vessel, to the master of a vessel, if he shows that 
he is familiar with the waterway used by the vessel. A Pilotage Exemption Certificate 
can also be granted to the navigating officer of a vessel meeting the same conditions. 
The Finnish Maritime Administration can also, on application, grant a vessel-specific 
exemption on compulsory pilotage to a vessel the master of which has long-term 
experience of navigating the vessel referred to in the application or a similar vessel in 
Finnish territorial waters.  (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a; Pilotage 
Act 940/2003) 
 
In Estonia, piloting has been arranged in a similar way as in Finland; the state-owned 
joint stock company AS EestiLots, the stockholder of which is the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications, offers the piloting services. Piloting is 
regulated in the Maritime Safety Act of Estonia and compulsory pilotage is conducted 
in the inland maritime waters and in the vicinity of ports, in the water areas of ports and 
between ports. (Maritime Safety Act RT2 I 2002; Matso 2006) 
 
Also in Russia, piloting services are offered by a state-owned piloting company and the 
state defines the areas and rules for using a pilot. The use of a pilot is practically always 
compulsory in Russia. In the Gulf of Finland, ships to St. Petersburg sail to the port in 
convoy. 
 
Baltic Sea piloting means piloting, where the Baltic Sea pilot acts as a pilot outside the 
territorial waters on the basis of a private contract. Baltic Sea piloting is based on IMO 
Recommendation (IMO A.480.XII). Finnish Baltic Sea pilots have made, in recent 
years, from four to ten pilotings per year, so it is very rare for ships in the Baltic Sea to 
use a Baltic Sea pilot. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
 
4.4.6 Waterway safety 
 
The condition of waterways is very crucial from the point of view of shipping safety; 
the depth and breadth of a waterway and its safety devices – channel alignment and 
buoyage – all are important aspects. The SOLAS Convention binds states to follow 
international recommendations on waterway marking, of which the most central is the 
IALA (International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse 
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4.4.7 Nautical charts 
 
Nautical charts of good quality are a precondition for safe shipping. The contracting 
states of the SOLAS Convention are committed to doing hydrographical surveying, to 
gathering other relevant information, to publishing and updating nautical charts in co-
operation with other countries and to following the recommendations of IHO 
(International Hydrographic Organization). In the framework of HELCOM, Baltic states 
have agreed to make a hydrographic surveying plan for the Baltic Sea in order to 
produce comprehensive, official nautical charts of the sea areas defined in the plan. 
(Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
Ships can use either paper or electric nautical charts. If electric charts are used, a ship 
must use electronic navigation systems (ECDIS = Electronic Chart Display and 
Information System) and official electronic charts (ENC), which have the type approval 
of IMO. ECDIS is obligatory for high speed crafts and, in 2010, it will be obligatory to 
other ship types as well. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
 
4.4.8 Information supply  
 
The contracting states of the SOLAS Convention are committed to informing the 
shippers of topical risks to shipping. Sea warnings are given on subjects such as the 
conditions of waterways and safety devices and of exceptional weather circumstances. 
The SOLAS Convention also obliges contracting states to organize sea weather services 
for shipping. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
 
4.4.9 Towage services 
 
Towage of ships in port areas and in entrance waterways enhances shipping safety, but 
there is no international regulation on the matter. Some ports have regulations on the 
use of tugs – in Finland, the ports of Sköldvik and Naantali require loaded tankers to be 
towed to/from the port all the way through the waterway leading to the port. Tugs are 
also needed in emergency situations at sea, for example, when a ship has machinery 
damage (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a). Guidelines on emergency 
towing are provided by the Bonn Agreement, which suggests the use of risk assessment 
to position and operate emergency towing vessels, factoring in prevailing 
meteorological conditions, traffic density etc. In emergency towing, tugs can be used as 
an escort or to hold in a given position. (Eide et al. 2007) 
 
 
4.5 Regulatory instruments – a summary 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the regulatory instruments of maritime safety and the main actors 
in each regulated sector. 
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Table 4.1 Regulatory instruments in maritime safety 
Regulated sector  Main actors 
Ship construction and 
equipment 





• handling of the cargo 
→ IMO 
Surveillance of ship 
conditions 
• flag state control 
• port state control 
• host state control 
• classification societies 
• vetting inspections 
→ IMO 
→ IMO, PARIS MOU 
→ EU 
→ private companies 
→ private companies 
Mariners & 
management 
• working conditions 
• employment conditions 
• manning of ships 
• safety management  
→ IMO, ILO 
 
Navigation • VTS → IMO 
 • ship reporting systems → IMO, regional co-  
operation 
 • traffic separation schemes and 
routings 
→ IMO, regional co-
operation 
 
 • traffic recommendations and 
restrictions 
→ IMO, regional co-
operation and states 
 • piloting → states 
 • waterway safety → IMO, IALA 
 • nautical charts → IMO, IHO 
 • information supply on weather, 
water level, ice situation etc. 
→ IMO 




4.6 Economic instruments 
 
In the shipping industry, economic instruments are mostly used for improving the 
competitiveness of the shipping sector, but they are also used for promoting maritime 
safety. Economic instruments are typically either private arrangements (such as 
insurances) or in the domain of national legislation. This makes it difficult to implement 
international, or even regional, economic instruments. For example, waterway 
maintenance or port dues have, in many countries, characteristics of a maritime safety 
policy instrument, but the systems vary from one country to another, as can be seen in 




Maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland – review on policy instruments   43 
4.6.1 Dues related to the maintenance of waterways 
 
In Finland, the state collects waterway dues from merchant ships in the territorial waters 
of Finland (Act on fairway dues 1122/2005). The waterway due is calculated on the 
basis of net weight and ice class, but there are certain exemptions in the system, such as 
the maximum amount of due per ship call and per year, or discount if a cargo ship is not 
fully loaded. 
 
In Estonia, the state collects two dues, which are called “the lighthouse due” and “the 
navigation due”. The dues are determined by the gross tonnage of a ship engaged in 
commercial activity and by the amount of days a ship is staying in Estonian ports or 
roadsteads. Also in Estonia, there are exemptions to the system, for example, ships with 
ice class IA or IA super and cruise ships get discounts. (Maritime Safety Act of Estonia) 
 
In Russia, dues related to the maintenance of waterways are gathered together with port 
dues (Chapter 4.6.2). 
 
 
4.6.2 Port dues 
 
Port dues are primarily dues that a port charges for its services, but port dues can and do 
have characteristics of a policy instrument. For example, current legislation in Finland 
regulates that all ships have to pay a waste management fee, even if they are not 
disposing waste in the port (Alusjäteasetus 635/1993). This system aims at the 
prevention of dumping waste at sea by making it economically unattractive. Otherwise, 
in Finland, port legislation gives ports the right to gather port dues for their services 
(Laki yksityisistä yleisistä satamista 1156/1994).   
 
In Russia, port administrations gather various port dues depending on the port, and the 
gathered dues are defined by the Federation of Russia. The gathered dues include dues 
on ship tonnage, waterway maintenance, pilotage, icebreaker assistance, waste disposal 
and other environment-related dues. (Portnews 2009) In Estonia, the Ports Act defines 
that port rules include port dues and fees for the receipt of bilge water, sewage, refuse 
and other pollutants. Port rules must be approved by the port authority in consultation 
with the Estonian Maritime Administration, and the requirements for port rules are 
approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications. (Ports Act of 
Estonia) 
 
In Sweden, port dues have been used for decreasing air pollution from shipping. In 
Sweden in 1996, an agreement between the Swedish Maritime Administration, the 
interested Swedish ship-owners and Swedish port industries was made to aim towards a 
decrease of 75% in NOx and SO2 emissions from ships, within a period of five years, by 
establishing differentiated waterway and port dues. The differentiation takes the form of 
a discount on less polluting ships. Regarding sulphur, a discount was given for using 
low sulphur fuel, whereas the NOx discount increased linearly with the decrease in 
emissions. For a limited time, subsidies were paid in the form of reimbursement of the 
fee for installing selected NOx reduction technologies. By 1999, 28 ports had 
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differentiated their port fees according to SO2 emissions and 15 according to NOx 
emissions. In 2000, 23 ships had registered for the nitrogen and 1450 ships for sulphur 
discounts. About 350–450 ships are estimated to have switched to low-sulphur fuel; the 
rest had already been using it. The differentiation of the waterway and port dues gave a 
boost to carrying on the innovation process for technology already under development 
and made it easier to undertake pilot installations and acquire crucial customers. 
(Mickwitz et al. 2008) 
 
 
4.6.3 Marine insurance 
 
Marine insurance is meant to cover the loss or damage of ships, cargo and any transport 
mean or property by which cargo is transferred, acquired, or held between the point of 
origin and the final destination. A marine insurance is a contract of mutual rights and 
obligations between the insurer and the insured. The basic principle is that the insured 
should not profit from the loss or be in a worse position than before the loss occurred. 
Marine insurance is usually split between the ships and the cargoes. (Noussia 2007) 
 
In law, marine insurance is often dealt with separate from other forms of insurance: in 
some countries, it is codified in a separate statute, while in others it is codified in the 
more general statutes of insurance. In some cases, insurance is obligatory: the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage enacts that a ship 
carrying oil must have an obligatory insurance. In Finland, for example, every ship 
visiting a Finnish port and carrying 200 tonnes or more of oil is obliged to have an 
insurance or other indemnity that covers the liabilities of oil damage as defined in 
regulation (Merilaki 1994/674).  
 
Marine insurance systems aim at the balanced spread of risks between the insurer and 
the insured. Insurance terms require a ship to be in such a condition that it can operate 
safely, in other words, a ship must be accepted by a classification society. The problem 
with sub-standard ships is that they are usually not insured at all, because their value is 
so low that the risk of losing a ship can be borne by the ship-owner. A ship with no 
insurance can compete in the market with lower prices. In such cases, it becomes the 
shippers’ responsibility to choose between cheap but unsafe transportation and more 
expensive but safe transportation. (Karvonen et al. 2006) Even though most ships are 
insured, many have much lower cover than required by the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC 1996), which is, in 2009, ratified only by 35% of 
the world fleet (European Commission 2009b).  
 
 
4.6.4 P&I clubs  
 
P&I (Protection & Indemnity) insurance clubs are associations of ship-owners, formed 
for the purpose of protecting and indemnifying themselves against claims (such as those 
arising from pollution, death or injury to crew or passengers and loss of cargo) by others 
on a mutual basis. While marine insurance is categorized as market insurance, P&I 
Clubs are a system of mutual insurance. Market insurance consists of financial bargain, 
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where cover is purchased for a fixed premium from a profit-making entity, while mutual 
insurance consists of non-profit making organizations. (Noussia 2007) About 90% of 
the world’s merchant fleet (by tonnage) is organized into P&I clubs. In the P&I club, 
each ship-owner is both an insurer and insured. The insurance premium paid by a 
member depends on the claims made by all the other members of the club. It is in the 
interest of members’ claims for it to be as low as possible. Mutuality creates a common 
interest in high safety and environmental standards. (Bennett 2001) 
 
An individual ship-owner might, however, be tempted to care less once insured, for 
knowing that the costs of an accident will be shared by all. The challenge for a Club is 
to create particular institutional arrangements to ensure that individual members behave 
according to the interests of the Club. Lack of homogeneity in the Club can also pose a 
risk to the interests of the Club when members are dispersed geographically or 
otherwise. Competition between Clubs can limit their influence on the safety and 
environmental performance of ship-owners, when members may jump from one club to 
another in order to obtain lower premiums. In his analysis on the role of P&I clubs in 
enhancing maritime safety and environmental performance, Bennett (2001) has 
concluded that the idea that P&I clubs would always act to promote quality shipping is 
unsustainable because of reasons mentioned above. P&I clubs primarily aim at 




4.6.5 Liability and compensation  
 
Liability and compensation for damage are central questions, both from the viewpoint 
of private (e.g. cargo damage and breaking down of the ship) and public interests, such 
as the cleanness of seas. In case of oil spills, the need for liability and compensation 
systems for protecting public interests and the interests of third parties, such as the 
inhabitants of the polluted area, have been long recognized. IMO has regulations on the 
matter; the latest version of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage is from the year 1992. It enacts that a ship must have an obligatory 
insurance and that an injured party is entitled to apply for compensation straight from an 
insurer. The liability of a ship-owner is limited and is determined by the net tonnage of 
the ship. However, for a ship-owner, there is a limitation of risk, which is not more than 
89.7 million SDR (=special drawing right), or about 106 million euro (in 2008). If the 
costs of oil pollution are more, they are covered from the oil pollution fund based on the 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Fees for the oil pollution compensation fund 
are based on the amount of transported oil and they are usually paid by the receiver of 
oil cargo. Maximum compensation from the fund per one damage case is 750 million 
SDR or about 780 million euro (in 2008). (HE 140/2008 vp)  
 
It is interesting and also disputable that such a limitation of liability is in use, when it 
comes to the liability questions of an oil spill. The origin of a limitation in liability in 
maritime law has a long history and it has been employed in various areas related to 
shipping activity. Limitation right is also in use in other forms of transportation. The 
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historical reasons for the limitation of liability are that it was needed to encourage the 
development of the shipping activity, which was considered risky, and that it was used 
to promote the national merchant fleet under competitive pressures. The limitation of 
liability has also been considered equitable to make all those who benefit from the 
activity bear the risk instead of only the transporter bearing it. Limitation of liability has 
also been considered necessary to meet the needs of liability insurance, as the capacity 
of the insurance market is finite. It seems that, when making the current legislation, the 
rationale of the limitation of liability was not even discussed and, in fact, the newer 
provisions of CLC 1969 (International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage) provide even better protection for ship-owners. (Faure & Hui 2008)  
 
There are exceptions to the limitation of liability, and it can be lost if the incident 
occurred as a result of actual fault or carelessness, which makes the ship-owner fully 
liable for the damage. However, insurance cover is usually lost in such cases and also 
when it becomes impossible to acquire compensation from a ship-owner who has 
declared bankruptcy. Actual accidents (e.g. Erika and Prestige) have also showed that 
the level of the limitation of liability is far from sufficient and the European Union has 
tried to renew the system in its maritime safety legislation packages I, II, and III in order 
to give the victims of severe oil spills adequate compensation. (Faure & Hui 2008)  
 
The limitation of liability has been criticized on the basis that it is actually a subsidy to 
the shipping industry at the cost of other interests. The tanker owner is not fully exposed 
to the costs of oil pollution damage, which can be regarded as a financial advantage. 
The previously mentioned problem with insurances could easily be resolved by the 
insurance providing cover only to a certain amount. The removal of the limitation of 
liability would provide incentives for prevention while currently the tanker owner can 
consider the accident as one where the limited amount of liability is the maximum 
damage that can be suffered and the victims will be compensated only partly. Liability 
rules can even have an eroding effect on the goals of the maritime safety policy. (Faure 
& Hui 2008; Gauci 1995) On the other hand, oil spill damage is definitely not in the 
interest of the ship-owner or operator when thinking about other than economic 
consequences: bad publicity, lost trust etc. The question is rather that the limitation of 
liability should be high enough to give a further incentive for a ship-owner to prevent 
oil damage.  
 
Current liability systems can also be criticized for that they are more directed to ensure 
adequate compensation than to prevent sub-standard shipping. The strictest liabilities 
and claims are imposed on the likely causes of catastrophic accidents – oil and chemical 
tankers and passenger ships – when presumably these sectors of shipping have the most 
advanced safety culture. For other types of ships, there is no such economic pressure on 
liability questions, and it is, to some extent, an unfair situation or at least strange from 
the point of view of maritime safety that those who are already the most safety-oriented 
carry a relatively heavier burden in this matter than others who actually are more likely 
to cause unwanted incidents. The same argument goes with insurances and P&I Clubs, 
in their possible role as a promoter of maritime safety (Bennett 2000), and as has 
already been noticed, with inspection systems as well (Chapter 4.2.6). 
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The liability of firms could be ensured by using third party actors, for example insurers. 
Firms can be required to show the evidence of financial responsibility before they are 
allowed to engage in risky activity. This can be done by purchasing insurance or by 
making the firm’s own assets legally accessible. If direct action against the insurer is 
allowed in legislation, the insurer becomes responsible for any liability when the 
likelihood that compensation is received increases. If insurers are put into this position, 
they will naturally require responsible operation of their clients and the amount of 
deductibles, future premiums and risk assessments become dependent on the behaviour 
of the insured in the present. (Bennett 2000) 
 
 
4.6.6 Incentives  
 
Incentives diminish costs for actors capable of proving that they operate in a safer way 
than is the normal practice, and thus also encourage other actors to improve their 
operations. In the shipping industry, several incentive systems have been developed to 
promote maritime safety, but none of them are in large scale use. Probably the most 
wide-ranging is the Green Award Certification System, which was developed in the 
1990s by the Green Award Foundation in Rotterdam (Chapter 4.2.5). The benefit of this 
certification is that certified ships are granted a reduction in port dues in ports that have 
joined the system. These include ports in the Netherlands, Belgium, Lithuania, Spain, 
Portugal, South Africa and New Zealand. (Green Award 2009; Kaps 2004) 
 
The problem with such systems is maintaining the necessary income for ports, when 
ships are getting reductions for port dues (Kaps 2004). One solution could be to collect 
higher port dues from other ships, but many times this is not possible for competitive 
reasons. Incentive systems are easier to carry out by nations that have more options for 
replacing the lost income. In the shipping industry, nations have used economic 
incentives mainly to maintain the competitiveness of the flag and to support industry 
economically, and not so much to reach maritime safety related targets. 
 
 
4.7 Information guidance  
 
Public information guidance means that authorities can share information on what they 
think is important and what might affect the behaviour of citizens or companies and 
hope to influence society this way. Maritime safety is also promoted with information 
guidance based instruments. For example, IMO gives codes, guidelines or 
recommended practices on important matters not considered suitable for regulations by 
formal treaty instruments. In the Baltic Sea area, the maritime authorities have an 
Internet service, Baltice.org, which contains information related to winter navigation in 
the Baltic Sea area, e.g. ice situation, traffic restrictions and information on ice 
navigation. (Baltic Icebreaking Management 2009). 
 
Information guidance can also include other instruments besides pure information 
guidance. A typical voluntary action is education, either short-term courses or longer-
lasting training. For example, in the Baltic Sea area, there are several service providers 
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who organize training on ice navigation. Also, different kinds of best practices cases, 
awards and, to some extent, certification can be seen as information guidance. The use 
of, for example, the Environmental Management System and audits set up processes 
that encourage self-critical thinking and learning and channel behaviour in a certain 
direction. Such systems also encourage actors to become active in their self-governance, 
and the evidence of EMS or other suchlike systems are increasingly required by 
investors, insurers, customers or suppliers. (Bennett 2000) These kinds of systems also 
bring fresh winds to the governance, because they enrol third parties into the promotion 
of public goods, instead of the state and command-and-control based policies. 
 
Maritime safety related awards include, for example, the International Maritime Prize, 
the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea and  the Safety at Sea International 
Awards. The International Maritime Prize is annually awarded by the IMO Council to 
the individual or organization judged to have made the most significant contribution to 
the work and objectives of IMO (IMO 2009b). This prize is by nature more like an 
acknowledgement than an encouragement to the shipping industry to enhance maritime 
safety.  
 
The IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea was launched in 2006, and the purpose 
of it is to provide international recognition for those who, at the risk of losing their own 
lives, perform acts of exceptional bravery, displaying outstanding courage in attempting 
to save a life at sea or in attempting to prevent or mitigate damage to the marine 
environment. (IMO 2009f)  
 
Safety at Sea International Awards is organized by Safety at Sea Magazine. The awards 
have been established to recognize innovative and original developments in safety 
equipment, systems, training and operations/management. In 2007, the training award 
was given to Transas of Russia for its distance simulation-based training for oil spill and 
rescue operations, which formed a part of an EU-funded scheme involving Russia, 
Finland and Estonia, the goal of which was to improve safety and environmental 
protection in the Gulf of Finland (Lloyd’s Register Fairplay 2009).  
 
However, information guidance works only if actors really act on the information, 
because information guidance is based on the self and mutual governance of actors. For 
it to be effective, other actors should refuse to work with actors not complying with 
requests, for example, by refusing insurance or finance, refusing to charter the ship, 
send cargo with the company or to load and unload the ship. This can be the only 
penalty resulting from information guidance based policies and, otherwise, such 
information guidance based actions are merely window dressing. (Bennett 2000) 
 
 
4.8 SAR and other “after accident” policies 
 
Accidents and other unwanted incidents can hardly be totally prevented. One category 
of policy instruments is those to minimize the consequences of an accident. Here, this 
category of policy instruments is presented only in short.  
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In accident situations, the number one priority is to prevent the loss of human lives. The 
SOLAS Convention defines the compulsory life-saving appliances and the appliances 
needed to send emergency messages. Emergency situations must be rehearsed regularly 
on board. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
Several Conventions (UN, IMO) oblige states to organize SAR (search and rescue) 
operations. SAR operations include the search and rescue of people in danger at sea, 
first aid and emergency communication. Finland, Russia and Estonia have made an 
agreement on defining responsibilities and on co-operation in emergency situations. 
National laws regulate concrete actions, when the accident has happened, for example, 
the duties and roles of different authorities, communication, and oil spill prevention and 
response activities. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
It is also important in accident situations to prevent the spilling of dangerous substances 
into the sea. The MARPOL Convention includes regulations on the structure and 
equipment of a ship that are meant to prevent spills, for example, the maximum size for 
cargo tanks, double-hulls (from 2010 forward), and the denial to carry oil in the fore 
peak. Every tanker with gross tonnage of over 150, and other cargo ships with gross 
tonnage of over 400, must have a Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan that contains 
terms of reference in emergency situations. Also, all chemical tankers with gross 
tonnage of over 150 must have a Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plan. 
(Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) In case of an oil spill, international 
co-operation is regulated by the IMO Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Co-Operation (Karvonen et al. 2006). Russia has not ratified the 
Convention, but the HELCOM Convention and the bilateral Convention between 
Finland and Russia agree on mutual assistance in case of an oil spill. (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2009a)  
 
Ports (or areas) of refuge are another way to minimize the harmful consequences of an 
accident (IMO Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Need of Assistance 
(Resolution A.949(23))). When a ship has suffered an incident and danger to life is not 
involved, the best way to prevent further damage or pollution is to transfer the cargo 
and bunkers and to repair the damage. Such an operation is best to be carried out in a 
place of refuge, which is preferably located near a coast rather than in open sea, where a 
ship is at the mercy of the weather. However, to bring such a ship into a place of refuge 
near a coast may endanger the coastal state, both economically and environmentally, 
and local authorities and people may strongly object to the operation. Therefore, 
granting access to a place of refuge is a political decision, which can only be taken on a 
case-by-case basis with due consideration given to the balance between the advantage to 
the affected ship and the risk to the environment resulting from that ship being near the 
coast. (IMO 2009g) The European Union has directed its member states to name the 
places for areas of refuge. (YLE 2006) 
 
Accident investigation is carried out after severe accidents in order to find out the 
causes, consequences and rescue measures of the accident. Accident investigation 
information is meant to improve safety and prevent future accidents. Accident 
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investigation does not interfere with liability or culpability questions. (Ministry of 
Transport and Communications 2009a)  
  
 
4.9 Maritime safety policy instruments – a summary  
 
The policy instruments presented in Chapter 4 are summarized in Figure 4.1. The focus 
of the report has been on preventive maritime safety policy instruments, which have 
been divided into regulatory, economic and information guidance instruments. With 
regard to the amount of legislation, regulatory instruments are the largest group. For 
economic instruments, it is typical that they are governed nationally or between the 
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Figure 4.1 Maritime safety policy instruments 
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5 THE FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE MARITIME SAFETY POLICY  
 
Despite the vast number of maritime safety regulations, new policies are developed at 
international and other levels and in many issues to further improve safety. Especially 
the developing of navigational aids, decreasing the environmental effects of shipping 
and decreasing the effects of the human factor in accident causes are issues where 
changes can be expected. Also, the wider use of economic instruments to promote 
maritime safety, such as compensation or green port dues, seems to have caught the 
interest of legislators. At the same time, existing regulations are also developed and 
updated to be more effective. In regard to existing regulations and those under 
development, it can be concluded that maritime safety risks are, at least at the political 






In IMO, maritime safety regulations are being developed in numerous issues and at 
numerous levels, ranging from technical details to the matters of principle. Here, only 





IMO is developing goal-based standards for the construction of ships. The premise 
behind the development of goal-based standards is that IMO should play a larger role in 
determining the fundamental standards for building new ships. The intention is not for 
IMO to take over the detailed work of the classification societies, but rather for IMO to 
state what has to be achieved, leaving classification societies, ship designers and naval 
architects, marine engineers and ship builders the freedom to decide how best to meet 
the required standards. (IMO 2009c) Drafts for the SOLAS amendments on making 
goal-based standards mandatory for new oil tankers and bulk carriers have been agreed 
on, as have the drafts for international goal-based ship construction standards for bulk 
carriers and oil tankers. The eventual adoption is planned to take place in 2010. (IMO 
News 1/2009) 
 
In 2010, new regulations concerning ship structures are coming into force. The use of 
single-hull tankers will mainly come to an end. Rules to limit the size of oil fuel tanks 
on new ships and ensure they are safely located are included in the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (the MARPOL Convention) 
which applies to tankers built in 2010 or after. In addition, new tankers must have a tank 
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5.1.2 The human factor  
 
The STCW Convention (Chapter 4.3.1) is being revised in order to develop the 
qualifications of seafarers and to take into consideration the changes in the working 
environment. Among other things, the qualifications of personnel in oil, gas and 
chemical tankers and of personnel taking care of electronic devices on board are 
revised. Also, changes in the watch keeping regulations, such as regulations concerning 
the reduction of the fatigue of seafarers, working hours and prevention of alcohol abuse 
on board, are being discussed. Changes in the STCW Convention are planned to be 
approved in 2010. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a) 
 
Regulations on bridge watch alarm (the SOLAS Convention Chapter V) are meant to 
obligate ships to have a device that alarms other officers on board, if a responsible 
person for ship operations has not reacted to alarms in the navigation bridge, or if it 
otherwise seems that this person is not actively engaged in the operation of the ship. 
This helps prevent accidents caused by the watch keeper falling asleep. This regulation 
is entering into force in phases during 2011-2014. (Ministry of Transport and 





The carriage of ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System) is becoming 
mandatory for ships on international voyages, under the SOLAS chapter V Safety of 
Navigation. Implementation is going to take place in phases during 2012-2018. The 
availability of electronic charts is a prerequisite for the use of ECDIS, and contracting 
governments must produce the needed charts before the system is implemented. The 
ECDIS devices will give all information on the sea area and traffic on the same radar 
display. The system will also sound an alarm if a ship is heading to too shallow a 
waterway for the depth of the ship. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a; 
IMO News 3/2008) 
 
LRIT (Long Range Identification and Tracking System) collects and distributes to the 
authorities information on the identity and position of ships flying their flag, wherever 
they are in the world. LRIT is included in the SOLAS Conventions’ chapter V, and its 
initial purpose has been to enhance security by providing ship identity and current 
location information for Contracting Governments to evaluate the security risk posed by 
a ship off its coast and to respond, if necessary, to reduce that risk. The system also has 
potential safety benefits, most notably for maritime search and rescue. Accurate 
information on the location of a ship in distress, as well as ships in the vicinity that 
could lend assistance, will save valuable response time. So, the purpose and scope of 
LRIT was extended in IMO to also include safety and environmental protection 
applications. (EMSA 2009) The European Union has decided to establish a European 
centre for managing LRIT data, which is run by EMSA. The system is planned to be 
operational from mid-2009. LRIT will also be able to follow ships flying non-EU flags 
that pass within 1 000 nautical miles of European coasts. (European Commission 
2009c) 
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In e-navigation, the aim is to integrate existing and new navigational tools, particularly 
electronic tools, in an all-embracing system enhancing navigational safety while 
simultaneously reducing the burden on the navigator. As the basic technology for such a 
system is already available, the challenge lies in ensuring the availability of all the other 
components of the system, including electronic navigational charts, and in using it 
effectively in order to simplify the display of the occasional local navigational 
environment. E-navigation would thus incorporate new technologies in a structured way 
and ensure that their use is compliant with the various navigational communication 
technologies and services already available. (IMO 2009h) 
 
 
5.1.4 The environmental effects of shipping 
 
Air pollution and other environmental effects of shipping, such as ship waste, sewage, 
ballast waters, anti-fouling paints or the energy efficiency of ships have been high on 
IMO’s agenda recently. Strict regulations on air pollution (greenhouse gases) are going 
to be implemented in the future. For example, the maximum allowed content of sulphur 
in fuel is defined in the IMO MARPOL Annex VI. The global limit at the moment is 
4.5%-S and 3.5%-S in 2012, and by 2020 it will be further limited to 0.5%-S. However, 
the Baltic Sea and the North Sea belong to the IMO-defined SECA (=Emission Control 
Areas) which have tighter restrictions: 1.5%-S until 2010, 1%-S from 2010 and 0.1%-S 
from 2015. For NOx emissions the three-tier program was agreed on in the IMO MEPC 
57, which will reduce the emissions of new engines and, through adaptation, the 
emissions of old engines (the IMO MARPOL Annex VI). (Shortsea Promotion Centre 
Finland 2009) It also seems that the reduction of air pollution from shipping is going to 
be the first area where IMO is implementing economic instruments. Such instruments 
would have purposes such as: climate change mitigation and adaptation activities; 
research and development; offsetting of emissions; and serving as an incentive for the 
industry to invest in more fuel-efficient technologies. (IMO 2009e) 
 
 
5.1.5 The Member State Audit Scheme 
 
The Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme is intended to assess how effectively a 
member state administers and implements the mandatory IMO instruments covered by 
the scheme. The scheme addresses issues such as conformance in enacting appropriate 
legislation for the IMO instruments, the administration and enforcement of the 
applicable laws and regulations by the Member State, the delegation of authority to 
recognized organizations, and the related control and monitoring mechanisms of the 
survey and certification processes by the Member States. With this system, IMO aims to 
make measurable improvements in the effectiveness of the international regulatory 
framework of shipping and to achieve harmonized and consistent global implementation 
of IMO standards. The scheme was approved by the IMO in 2003, but it works on a 
voluntary basis. (IMO 2009i) In the European Union, auditing of national maritime 
administration will be compulsory (Chapter 5.2.2). 
 
54   Kuronen & Tapaninen 
 
5.2 The European Union 
 
The European Union has been active in promoting an integrated maritime policy, which 
means that all the aspects of marine resources and their use should be viewed together 
in order to promote sustainable development and to avoid conflicting policies. (Ministry 
of Transport and Communications 2009a)  
 
The European Union has defined the core issues of maritime safety policy to be: 
• “the aim is to eliminate sub-standard shipping, increase the protection of crews 
and passengers, reduce the risk of environmental pollution and ensure that 
operators who follow good practices are not put at a commercial disadvantage” 
• prevention of accidents and pollution: “improve the quality of European flags, 
review legislation on port state control, amend the directive on traffic 
monitoring (e.g. SafeSeaNet), improve rules relating to classification societies” 
• accident response: improving accident investigation, fair compensation to 
passengers in the event of an accident, introducing a directive on ship-owners’ 
civil liability coupled with a mandatory insurance scheme 
• raising safety standards for ships and seafarers  
• stiffer sanctions for ship-sourced pollution (European Commission 2006). 
 
The European Union has promoted these goals most recently in June 2009, when the 
European Commission published the “European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region” (COM(2009) 248/3) and with the Third Maritime Safety Package.  
 
 
5.2.1 The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
 
For maritime issues, the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region sets the 
goals for becoming a model region of clean shipping and for becoming a leading region 
in maritime safety and security. The first goal is pursued with air pollution control 
systems (SOx emission control area in 2015) and with systems to collect ship generated 
waste, for example, by encouraging voluntary measures to reduce discharges and by 
supporting the HELCOM proposal for IMO asking for a prohibition of the discharge of 
waste from ships, especially from passenger ships. It is also suggested that 
differentiating port dues depending on the environmental impact (e.g. emissions, the 
managing of waste and ballast waters, the use of environmentally friendlier 
technologies, and having high safety standards) of ships would be introduced in the 
Baltic Sea area. (Commission of the European Communities 2009) 
 
The second goal (to become a leading region in maritime safety and security) is pursued 
with the improvements of traffic organization measures, which involve the monitoring 
of ship movements. Also, more efficient surveillance, routing systems and addressing of 
the human factor are proposed as key means to enhancing maritime safety in the Baltic 
Sea. At a more concrete level, these would mean the creation of a common maritime 
management system and monitoring, information and intelligence sharing environment 
for the Baltic Sea and improvement of the coordination of systems relating to the 
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routing of ships, the monitoring of the vessel traffic and the consideration of the 
establishment of new systems. It is proposed that the Baltic Sea region would become a 
pilot region for e-navigation. It is also emphasized that ships, especially those carrying 
dangerous cargo, should be up to the highest maritime safety standards. The human 
factor is addressed by developing training, for example upgrading seafarers’ 
competence (ICT, security and navigation in ice conditions). (Commission of the 
European Communities 2009) 
 
 
5.2.2 The Third Maritime Safety Package 
 
In 2005, The European Commission gave the Third Maritime Safety Package, which 
includes seven proposals for regulations. The objectives of the Package are preventing 
accidents and improving measures in case of an accident. The contents of the Package 
were approved in December 2008. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 2009a)  
 
Table 5.1 Summary of the contents of the Third Maritime Safety Package (European Commission 2009a) 
Topic Purposes Examples of measures 
Flag State 
responsibilities  
• the flags of all the EU 
countries have good 
standing (not blacklisted 
or on the grey list) 
• to incorporate the IMO’s 
flag-state audit scheme 
into the EU law and 
introduce certification of 
national maritime 
authorities 
• the EU countries must ensure 
that in a port state inspection 
detained ships flying their flag 
are brought into line with the 
regulations 
• set up a quality management 
system for the maritime 
authorities 




• make the inspection 
procedures of 
classification societies 
more rigorous and 
empower the 
Commission to carry out 
audits and impose 
penalties 
• make the current 
directive more readable 
and give stakeholders 
greater legal certainty  
• the classification societies are 
to set up an independent joint 
body to certify their quality-
management systems 
• reformed system of penalties 
– classification societies that 
do not do their work properly 
can be fined and in the most 
serious cases their recognition 
withdrawn 
Port State control • to make control 
mechanisms in port 
states more efficient and 
to prevent substandard 
ships visiting the EU 
ports 
• the target is to check all 
ships and perform more 
frequent inspections of 
• improve the regime for 
banning substandard ships 
• high-risk ships will be 
inspected every 6 months, 
average-risk ships every 12 
months, and low-risk ships 
every three years. The profile 
of ships is determined by ship 
type, age and flag, the 
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high-risk ships company’s past performance 
and the number of times the 
ship has been detained. 
Vessel traffic 
monitoring 
• improve knowledge of 
maritime traffic by 
improving the collection 
of information and 
setting up a network for 
sharing information 
between the EU 
countries 
• Reduce the risks of 
merchant vessels 
colliding with fishing 
vessels 
• Improve the decision-
making process for 
accommodating ships in 
need of assistance in 
places of refuge, to limit 
major coastal pollution 
• SafeSeaNet becomes standard 
in the EU 
• establish a European LRIT 
centre to collect identification 
data and monitor shipping at 
long distance 
• deploy information and 
prevention measures when ice 
formation creates a serious 
risk for shipping 
Accident 
investigation 
• to provide clear EU 
guidelines for technical 
investigations and 
lessons learnt after 
accidents at sea 
• investigation methods and 
procedures must be 
harmonized to achieve 
comparable quality in all EU 
countries 
• the bodies responsible for 
investigations must be 
independent of all parties 
involved in an accident, 
including the national 
maritime authorities 
• an EU database on accidents 





• to introduce a uniform 
set of rules on 
compensating passenger 
victims of accidents 
• all carriers must be insured 
and victims could apply 





• to require all shipowners 
to be insured against 
damage to third parties 
caused by their ships 
• the insurance cover must 
correspond to the limits in the 
LLMC 1996  
• ships not carrying a 
commercial insurance 
certificate may be detained or 
expelled 
• the rules will take effect in 
2012 by which the EU 
member states have 
committed to ratifying the 
LLMC 1996 
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5.2.3 Vessel traffic service systems 
 
The European Union has been promoting the use of electronic vessel traffic service 
systems such as AIS, LRIT, SafeSeaNet, and there are also new systems under 
development: Galileo (satellite radio navigation programme) and GMES (Global 
Monitoring for the Environment and Security). The efficient use of these systems is one 
of the most important measures in enhancing maritime safety and they also lessen the 





The main objective of SafeSeaNet is to provide a European platform for maritime data 
exchange between the maritime administrations of the Member States, by setting-up a 
telematic network between all the maritime EU Member States, Norway and Iceland for 
their co-operation in preventing maritime pollution and accidents at sea. SafeSeaNet is 
run by EMSA. The authorized users can request the information they need from the 
system, such as information on ship operations (accidents, pollution incidents etc.) and 
on the dangerous cargoes carried by ships. SafeSeaNet is still evolving. New features 
are added to the system, which aim at satisfying new user requirements in line with 
legal obligations imposed by applicable European legislation. (EMSA 2006; EMSA 
2008)   
 
 
5.3 The regional and national levels 
 
HELCOM has launched The HELCOM Baltic Sea Action Plan in 2007, which is a 
programme to restore the good ecological status of the Baltic marine environment by 
2021. To prevent accidental pollution from maritime traffic, the Action Plan focuses on 
winter navigation safety and efficiency (e.g. strengthening co-operation within the 
framework of BIM and encouraging ships to use trained crew and voluntary pilotage for 
winter navigation), on the development of vessel traffic control services (e.g. the 
modification of AIS information content) and on the support of IMO initiatives for the 
general requirement of ECDIS as early as possible. (HELCOM 2008) 
 
The navigational safety of the Gulf of Finland and the whole Baltic Sea also seems to be 
high on the agenda at the national level. In Finland, for example, a system that 
automatically follows the movements of ships and gives automatic warnings in case of 
potential dangerous situations is being developed. (Finnish Maritime Administration 
2009c) It has also been proposed that the vessel traffic operators should have access to 
the planned routes of vessels in real time. The system would be similar to that of air 
traffic control. Ships would thus have to follow certain routings, announced in advance, 
and the maritime traffic control operators would communicate with and monitor ships to 
ensure they are on their designated routes. The system would also follow the near future 
situations and provide warnings as well as commands to ships if they are about to run 
into danger. Similarly, the authorities could see in advance if the announced route is 
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suited to the tonnage and other features of the ship. (Nikula 2008) Such a system is 
currently under development in the Finnish Maritime Administration. Route planning is 
recommended by IMO but it is not obligatory to provide route planning information for 
authorities. (Meriväylä 3/2009) 
 
Finland, Estonia and Russia have decided to submit a proposal to IMO on the 
improvement of traffic separation schemes in the Gulf of Finland. The proposal 
includes, for example, the widening of the traffic lanes and the establishing of a new 
security zone in the area. These changes would come into force earliest in July 2010. 
(Finnish Maritime Administration 2009c) 
 
In Finland, implementation of the database “Insjö”, that collects information about 
incidents and near miss situations, is being prepared. Insjö is already in use in Sweden. 
Information on near misses and dangerous situations come from the shipping 
companies’ non-conformity reports. (Ministry of Transport and Communications 
2009a) 
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6 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
 
Government, financial, administrative and community resources are limited and must be 
deployed where they are the most likely to have the greatest positive impact. It is 
important to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the range of instruments in terms of 
the stated objectives and to identify the circumstances in which they are the most likely 
to make a positive contribution to the outcome sought. (Greiner et al. 2000) Policy 
analysis must also include an analysis of the costs of regulations to private actors – in 
most cases, there is a constant contradiction between economic interests and public 
interests (Karvonen et al. 2006). In this chapter, views on the effectiveness of policy 
instruments and some methods to evaluate them are presented.  
 
 
6.1 General views on the effectiveness of different policy instruments  
 
In comparison with economic instruments, regulatory instruments are very effective and 
easy to enforce, because they are, by nature, compulsory. The weaknesses of regulatory 
instruments can be their economic efficiency and public acceptance, and their enactment 
and implementation can be expensive, difficult or practically impossible. (Vieira et al. 
2007) Regulatory policy instruments may not promote changes or innovations because 
there is no economic incentive (Klemmensen et al. 2007). 
 
Economic instruments can reach environmental targets with good economic efficiency 
from the point of view of a more social-efficient allocation of resources. However, 
economic instruments often face acceptance difficulties, because they tend to increase 
prices. If they have lateral effects or in combination with other policies, they can be 
more acceptable, if the price increase in the first is compensated by the price decrease in 
the other. Recently, the popularity of economic regulations has been decreasing, 
because they are seen to distort the market competition and to reduce overall economic 
efficiency. (Vieira et al. 2007)  
 
For example, from economic instruments, environmental taxation has been most widely 
used in the energy and fuel sectors, although it was done often for other than 
environmental purposes, such as to reduce the dependence on the imported energy 
sources. Still, the use of fossil energy sources has grown worldwide and environmental 
taxation can be said to have had very little effect on this trend. How efficient 
environmental taxes are depends much on the price elasticity of the fields concerned. In 
the energy sector, price elasticity seems to be low – this means that the rise in prices has 
very little effect on the consumption. In these cases, it is mainly the state that benefits 
from taxation as an income source. It is in the prices of high elasticity, where 
environmental taxation can really contribute to behaviour, or in other words, where 
already a slight rise in prices can change consumption patterns. How low or high the 
price-elasticity is depends, for example, on the availability of alternatives and the 
indispensability of the object concerned. (Klemmensen et al. 2007) 
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Mickwitz et al. (2008) have analyzed the common claims connected with the 
effectiveness of policies in promoting environmentally friendlier technologies by using 
the Finnish pulp and paper industry and the marine engine industry as examples. These 
claims include that regulations do not provide any additional incentive to innovate, that 
economic instruments are superior, since they impose a cost and therefore provide a 
continuous incentive to innovate. In their study, Mickwitz et al. (2008) found both 
supporting and contradicting experiences for these claims, which caused them to 
conclude that the effectiveness of various policy instruments is dependent on the 
context of their use and often differs from theoretical assumptions presented in 
literature. For an effective economic instrument, the costs have to be sufficiently high in 
comparison with the alternatives. Combinations of policies simultaneously affecting 
supply and demand are more effective than just one type of policy on its own. 
(Mickwitz et al. 2008)  
 
One aspect of the effectiveness of regulatory and economic instruments is what happens 
in case of non-compliance. Non-compliance should result in penalties or economic 
consequences severe enough to minimize the temptation of an actor to break the rules. 
(Greiner et al. 2000) 
 
 
6.2 The criteria for effective maritime policy instruments 
 
Vieira et al. (2007) have developed a system to assess transport policy instruments, 
where a set of policies is evaluated against certain criteria and in relation to each other. 
Also, Greiner et al. (2000) had very similar criteria for policy evaluation. These criteria 
are presented below. 
• Effectiveness refers to the potential improvements in the object attempted to 
change. It relates to whether an instrument is technically and otherwise suitable 
for achieving a goal. Performance indicators are needed to monitor the effects of 
policies. (Greiner et al. 2000; Vieira et al. 2007) 
• Economic efficiency relates the effectiveness to the implementation costs of an 
instrument and to the economic efficiency of an instrument in a collective sense, 
assessing the total benefits of the associated change in risk minimizing against 
its total costs. (Greiner et al. 2000; Vieira et al. 2007) 
• Acceptability refers to the stakeholders’ level of agreement on a new policy 
instrument and to the political and communal acceptability of an instrument. 
Acceptability is a necessary condition for the durability of the policy. (Greiner et 
al. 2000; Vieira et al. 2007)) 
• Enforcement indicates how effectively a policy instrument can be implemented. 
Some instruments can be difficult to implement, even though they would 
probably be effective. Vieira et al. (2007) present the following types of barriers 
for implementation: legal and institutional (legal or regulatory conflicts, legal 
powers are spread through various institutions or organizations), resource or 
financial (lack of financial or physical resources to implement an instrument), 
political and cultural (some groups oppose policy) and technological (lack of 
suitable technology). (Greiner et al. 2000; Vieira et al. 2007) 
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• Lateral effects refer to the possible spill-over effects of an instrument in other 
sectors, e.g. the reduction of air pollution can improve people’s health, which 
decreases health care expenses. (Vieira et al. 2007) 
• Incentive and innovation effects relate to the question whether an instrument 
encourages experimentation and change and provides an ongoing incentive for 
improvement. (Greiner et al. 2000) 
 
Effective policy instruments should also be coherent with overall policy orientations. 
Policies should not be evaluated separately. Some set of policies can together be more 
effective than any single policy. In their study on transport policy instruments, Vieira et 
al. 2007 found that most of the studied policy instruments had positive synergy effects, 
i.e. the effectiveness of instruments implemented together is potentially bigger than the 
effectiveness of each instrument separately. It is also important to look at which current 
policies might provide conflicting incentives and which should be removed. Policy 
instruments should also be reviewed if the context of maritime shipping system 
changes. (Vieira et al. 2007; Greiner et al. 2000; Walker 2000)  
 
Huppes & Simonis (2009) distinguish three groups of criteria for effective policy (Table 
6.1). First-order criteria are related to the direct operational consequences of the 
application of the instrument. Second-order criteria relate to broader aspects of 
administration and economy. Strategic criteria, the most general of the categories, relate 
the instrument to the broader culture and institutions in the society. 
 
Table 6.1 Criteria for evaluating policy instruments (adapted from Huppes & Simonis 2009) 
First-order criteria Second-order criteria Strategic criteria 
• Effectiveness • Social and political 
acceptability 
• Fitting in with the 
broader conceptual 
framework for public 
policy 
• Social costs • Within administrative 
capacities 
• Fitting in with the 
broader institutional 
framework of society 
• Distributive justice • Limited changes in 
competitiveness 
• Fitting in with 
general cultural 
developments 









6.2.1 The system diagram for maritime safety 
 
Walker (2000) suggests that the first step in policy analysis is to define the system of 
interest, which means: 1) defining the boundaries of the system, 2) defining the 
structure of the system and 3) defining the output of the system. In this study, the 
system is commercial shipping in the Gulf of Finland. The structure of the system can 
be described in the system diagram (Figure 6.1). The system diagram can be used as a 
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tool to systematically think of how the system can change in the future. It brings out the 
aspects that are likely to have an effect on the performance of policies. The primary 
outputs or interests in this study are the accidents – which policies are the most effective 
in preventing oil accidents and their environmental effects. 
 
In the system diagram, there are four types of elements: 
1) physical characteristics – weather, sea depths etc. 
2) ship characteristics – the quality of the ships, the equipment on board, the 
capabilities of the crew 
3) traffic flows – the number and type of ships and their cargo 
4) policy instruments – the combination of instruments and subsystems that aim to 
ensure efficient and safe movement of sea traffic. (Walker 2000) 
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The extent to which these measures affect the desired goal depends on the 
characteristics of the future system – traffic flows, ship characteristics and maritime 
safety policy system (Walker 2000). 
 
 
6.2.2 Formal safety assessment 
 
IMO has developed the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) method which can be used to 
enhance maritime safety and as a tool to evaluate new regulations for maritime safety 
and to make comparisons between existing and possibly improved regulations. FSA 
consists of five steps: 
1. the identification of relevant accident scenarios with potential causes and 
outcomes 
2. the evaluation of risk factors 
3. the identification of risk control options (RCO) 
4. determining the cost-effectiveness of previous RCOs 
5. recommendations for decision-making (Ruud & Mikkelsen 2008). 
 
The cost-effectiveness criterion is based on the calculation of the expected risk 
reduction and the costs of implementation and operation of the RCO – the latter should 
not exceed the previous (Ruud & Mikkelsen 2008). The problem with FSA studies has 
sometimes been the lack of adequate data for the proper analysis of risk factors and 
different applications of the guidelines (Knapp & Franses 2009). 
 
The FSA method was used, for example, in the evaluation of navigational arrangements 
and in measures in the Sound between Denmark and Swede (Øresund). For the FSA 
steps 1 and 3, a workshop was organized. It resulted in a list of 66 identified hazards 
and a list of 44 risk reducing measures. The FSA step 2 calculations were made to 
estimate risks associated with collisions and groundings. Step 4 – cost-benefit analysis – 
was performed according to the Danish Ministry of Transport’s guidelines for social-
economical evaluation. Recommendations for decision making (step 5) resulted in a list 
of recommendations for cost-effective measures and a list of recommendable measures 
depending on the results of additional clarification. (Rambøll Danmark A/S 2006)   
 
 
6.2.3 The effectiveness of IMO Conventions 
 
Knapp & Franses (2009) have studied the effectiveness of major IMO Conventions with 
the econometric model. There are two types of measures: measures that take effect prior 
to coming into force (e.g. the single-hull tanker phase-out) and measures that become 
relevant after they come into force (e.g. the operational changes of the vessel). This 
aspect affects how fast measures will improve safety. In the long run, effectiveness can 
be calculated from the number and type of casualties. Knapp & Franses (2009) found 
out in their study that the introduction of conventions shows a decreasing effect on the 
number of casualties, some show a positive effect and others are insignificant. The 
SOLAS was perceived to show negative effects on the number of serious casualties. 
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Also, the adoption of the ISM Code had a negative effect on the number of casualties, 
especially for dry bulk carriers and general cargo ships. Also, MARPOL and especially 
the phase-out of single-hull tankers decreased the number of accidents with pollution. It 
was also discovered that, from ship types, tanker safety showed positive effects on 
almost all studied legal instruments. Disappointing was that human related conventions, 
with working and living conditions and certification, presented only a small amount of 
negative effects, or in other words, human related measures seem to be weak in impact.  
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7 CRITIQUE OF THE MARITIME SAFETY POLICY SYSTEM  
 
The maritime safety policy system has been criticized on many points. Most of them are 
connected to each other, which reflects that ultimately the problem lies in the 
foundations of the system. In this chapter, the weak points of the maritime safety policy 
system are explored and what has been proposed as more effective alternatives for the 
current system are presented. At the end, the effectiveness of the current system is 
analyzed in the light of the criteria that were presented in Chapter 6. 
 
 
7.1 The weak points of the maritime safety policy system 
 
Although maritime safety regulations can be proven to have improved maritime safety, 
when looking at, for example, the number of casualties and their seriousness, there are 
still unwanted phenomena in the shipping industry from the point of view of maritime 
safety. Shipping still causes harmful effects, such as environmental pollution or 
accidental deaths. Sub-standard or otherwise obscurely managed ships are able to sail in 
the world seas. The inability of international regulations to take local circumstances and 
special needs into consideration has led to different kinds of regional arrangements, 
which erode the international legislation system.  
 
According to Roe (2008), current policy-making fails in many ways on many fronts: it 
fails to have the desired effect, it is generated by inappropriate bodies (national 
governments rather than international authorities), it is diffuse and partial (Port State 
Control and the failure to eliminate sub-standard ships), and many times it is unclear 
where it emerges from, the motives behind it or the methodology for its application. 
Roe suggests that the problem in making effective policies on shipping lies in the failure 
to understand the relationships between jurisdictions operating at international, supra-
national and national levels, which makes it possible for unconcerned ship-owners to 
take advantage of the failings of the current regulation systems and in the failure to 
incorporate the stakeholders’ interests into the jurisdiction process. One sign of existing 
policy complexities is the number of both public and private networks within shipping 
that are somehow involved in regional and international jurisdictions. For example, 
policy discussions on shipping labour might involve, not just the EU member states, but 
also unions, regional representatives, port authorities, the EU Commission, the 
European Parliament and pressure groups. (Roe 2008: Roe 2009) 
 
The international regulation process is often slow, and the result can become a 
compromise of compromises (Mitroussi 2004; Stopford 2009). At the regional level, 
there would often be preparedness to react more quickly to the deficiencies in the 
maritime safety system. IMO does not support regional decision-making and regional 
systems are problematic from the point of view of the global shipping industry. It 
affects the competitiveness issues and can lead to a situation where stricter rules, for 
example, for ship conditions make ships with poorer condition operate in areas where 
there are no such rules. The decrease of risk in one place leads to the increase of risk in 
another (Karvonen et al. 2006).  
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The IMO legislation can mostly be considered reactive - regulations are revised or 
tightened after major sea accidents and preventive actions are still uncommon. This kind 
of “post-accident” policy is often unsuccessful. The policy-making is not very 
comprehensive, and one particular risk gets too much attention (Goulielmos 2001; 
Karvonen et al. 2006; Knapp & Franses 2009).  
 
At the international level, national representatives make up the IMO, constructing 
maritime policies for the globalized industry from a national perspective. Problems arise 
when national interests conflict with supra-national ideas. The failures of shipping 
policies derive from the development of internationalized ownership of industrial and 
capital operation resulting from national protectionist regulations. The tonnage tax 
regimes are the clearest evidence of this. The nested hierarchical governance model 
applied to shipping shows signs of failure, as it does not adequately reflect the activities, 
desires and ambitions of its constituents. An example of such an occasion, where 
national or supra-national legislation has conflicted with the international level, is the 
case of double-hull tankers, which were first required by the United States and the US 
Oil Pollution Act. Later in the EU, a number of member states introduced legislation to 
enforce the use of double-hull oil tankers before it was agreed on at the EU level and 
well before the date recommended by IMO. (Mitroussi 2004; Roe 2008; Roe 2009) 
 
The contradiction in the current maritime legislation system is also manifested in the 
PSSA system, where the principle of freedom of the high seas and uniform international 
legislation is challenged. The designation of the PSSA area can be seen as an attempt to 
extend national and regional authority to the sea area (Uggla 2007). In fact, such 
regional arrangements can be regarded as a failure of the international system to make 
effective regulations in the shipping industry (Goss 2008; Kaps 2004).  
 
The current governance system of the maritime industry has been criticized for being 
old-fashioned and ineffective. The makeshift repairs of the current system are not 
enough and the current regulatory framework does not protect the seas (Uggla 2007). 
For flag states to justify their juridical competence in respect to ships and seamen would 
require a demonstration of effectiveness and fairness in their individual and collective 
ability to govern and regulate ship safety issues in a uniform manner – the available 
evidence shows the opposite. It also seems that the opinion of the maritime industry 
shows that there are enough regulations but the problem is their inadequate 
implementation (Kovats 2006). 
 
 
7.1.1 Third party involvement  
 
The discussion on effective policies is often centred on the terms of public versus 
private, state versus civil society, command-and-control versus market-based incentives 
etc. This kind of debate is quite unhelpful, and it should be remembered that market-
based policies also involve government co-ordination. In most cases, governance is not 
either public or private but both. Regulations also depend on the enrolment of third 
parties, both public and private (financial firms, insurers, government agencies, 
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auditors, consultants etc.). These third parties have the power to influence the behaviour 
of companies. They can implement incentives or sanctions on other parties, from the 
making or breaking of social and economic relationships to concrete financial penalties 
formalized in legally binding contracts. Still, third parties are rarely exploited in the 
promotion of public interests such as maritime safety. In maritime regulations, such 
third party actors as associations of ship-owners, cargo owners, insurers, classification 
societies and banks have the potential to exert their influence over ship safety and 
environmental standards. The third parties could be enrolled to assist the public policy, 
for instance, by holding them liable for environmental damage caused by their clients, 
making it a legal requirement that the targets of regulators use the machinery of third 
parties (such as auditors or insurers). (Bennett 2000)  
 
Hänninen (2007) has observed that the marine system is lacking egalitarian stakeholder 
groups to monitor risks and risk taking behaviour in maritime transportation. In other 
industries, such as in the nuclear power production and in the forest industry, egalitarian 
watch and interest groups are common and they provide fresh and unconventional views 
on matters of safety, thus creating pressure on other groups to pay attention to and 
upgrade safety related risk classification and regulatory practices. 
 
 
7.1.2 Grey economy in the shipping industry  
 
All companies in the shipping industry are not the same. There are companies that buy 
cheap second-hand ships, operate them as cheaply as possible, do not care about safety 
measures, and when repairs become too expensive, they abandon the ships and their 
crews in some obscure port. There are also companies that are very active in promoting 
safe shipping; they are willing to test new technologies, act as good employers and 
achieve a good reputation among the public. The problem is that both the commendable 
and the non-commendable companies are competing in the same market. Competitive 
pressure has led, for example, to crew sizes being cut to levels that might be considered 
dangerous. However, competition should not be regarded as a negative matter in itself, 
as long as all the players have the same starting point. The current regulation system 
enables the situation to be far from that. The implementation of international 
jurisdiction is based on flag states, and flag states have very different standards on 
implementing regulations. (Goss 2008)  
 
The shipper also plays a crucial role in maritime safety. For example, in the case of the 
Erika accident, it turned out that the ship was chartered because of the affordability of 
the offered transportation, and the shipper did not have much interest in the condition of 
the ship (Karvonen et al. 2006). It should be discussed what the liability of a cargo 
owner and a shipper is in case on an accident (Bennett 2000). If a shipper requires a 
high safety level from a transporter instead of looking solely at the price of 
transportation, obscure firms are not able to operate in the market and distort fair market 
competition. 
 
It also seems that, in the shipping industry, complex corporate structures are used for 
minimizing the liability of the owner. This can lead to a situation where a victim of a 
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maritime incident is only one of a long list of substantial claimants against the ship and 
the victim is never able to get compensation for the harm suffered. (Gauci 1995) 
 
 
7.2 Alternatives to the current maritime safety policy system 
 
An industry-wide self-governing and democratic constitution composed of the maritime 
institutions and arrangements of full and equal representation from all operational 
sectors of the industry has been proposed as an alternative to the current system. 
However, the current foundation of international law-making is an obstacle to such a 
system, because the current foundation is based on sovereign states, treaties and 
international conventions. According to an alternative juridical concept, ships could be 
categorized as subjects of international law, so that legally binding rules could be made 
directly for them by the international community without the legislative involvement of 
sovereign states. The advantages of such a system are said to be numerous. Ships and 
seamen would be brought under the protection of regulations relating to marine 
technical and ship management standards. Seamen’s social security and employment 
conditions would be improved. Sub-standard vessels (which are the main reasons for 
unfair competition for cargo and causes of environmental pollution and accidents at sea) 
would be eliminated and the exploitative employment practices for seamen would cease. 
The interpretation and implementation of rules would be uniform. (Kovats 2006) 
However, such a revision of the international law of the sea seems remote at the 
moment, and the inherent risk in the self-government of an industry is that regulatory 
goals are watered down in favour of private interests (Bennett 2000). 
 
Roe (2008; 2009) proposes new approaches to shipping policy, which are called multi-
level governance or polycentric governance systems. Multi-level governance means that 
central government authority is dispersed both vertically, to locate at other territorial 
levels, and horizontally, to non-state actors. Multi-level governance is thus 
characterized by overlapping and multiple jurisdictions, in contrast to the simple 
hierarchical approach, and it allows the integration of state and non-state actors and the 
dispersion of state activity to supra-national, regional and local authorities in a way that 
reflects the shipping industry itself. Polycentric governance systems go one step further; 
they create a more complex policy-making framework encompassing a variety of 
policy-generating origins across all types of institutions, both private and public 
(governments, interest groups, political parties, commercial companies etc.) There are 
no boundaries between different actors. International jurisdiction determines the levels, 
but concrete measures can be decided locally in co-operation with different actors. 
These governance systems may look complex, but according to Roe, they offer a 
mechanism to reflect the actual activities within the maritime sector and the priorities of 
the stakeholders involved (Roe 2008; Roe 2009).  
 
 
7.3 The challenge of the human factor and safety culture 
 
The human factor (Figure 7.1) has been identified as the most notable cause of maritime 
accidents (e.g. Karvonen et al. 2006; Hänninen 2008; Trucco et al. 2008), and, in all 
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shipping accidents, the human factor plays some role. The development of technology 
has led to the reduction of failures in technology, which in turn has revealed the 
underlying level of influence of human error in accident causation (Hetherington et al. 
2006). Also, the influence of economic pressure in a strongly competitive industry may 
have added to the human factor causing shipping accidents (Trucco et al. 2008).4  
 
 
Figure 7.1 Framework forthe human factors contribution in shipping accidents (adapted from 
Hetherington et al. 2006)  
 
If the human factor is seen as the major cause of accidents, effective policies should 
take into consideration how the effect of the human factor in accident causes could be 
diminished. It has already been long recognized in the shipping industry, including 
IMO, that effective maritime safety policy should make safety an integral part of the 
day-to-day activities, instead of just making technical regulations (Mitroussi 2004). 
However, it appears to be difficult to find good policies to tackle the human factor. 
Safety management, including inspection and training, is commonly thought to be the 
key means for tackling the human factor’s contribution to the accidents (Trucco et al. 
2008). Also, working conditions, safety culture on board and the proper use of 
technological and other tools have a role in preventing accidents caused by the human 
factor (Karvonen et al. 2006). 
 
The human factor related errors can be of two kinds: active and latent errors. Active 
errors are the ones made by the pilot, the control room crew, the ship officers or other 
operators. However, the biggest threat to safety comes from latent errors, which are 
caused by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance, poor management 
decisions etc. The active error made by the operator is just a finishing touch in the 
human factor based errors leading to casualties (Hänninen 2008). In other words, the 
human factor based error can be said to be the final link of a long and complex chain of 
organizational and systemic errors. According to Hetherington et al. (2006), the 
                                                 
4 Comprehensive review on the human factor in risk analysis of marine traffic can be found in Hänninen 
(2008). 
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fundamental error inducing character in shipping lies in the social organization, 
economic pressure and the structure of the industry.  
 
It has been discovered, for example, that the predominant causes of accidents have been 
the misjudgements of ship masters and pilots, or the lack of comprehension between the 
pilot and the master or among crew members, or the inattention of the pilot and the 
officer of the watch. Flag states require that each ship have a working language that 
each employee must speak to a certain standard, but is this always the case? In 
emergency situations, the capability to speak the working language coherently and 
competently can have a crucial role. (Hetherington et al. 2006) 
 
In the study on marine casualties at the Strait of Istanbul (Arslan & Turan 2009), several 
human-related factors affecting marine casualties were found. They were divided into 
four categories: 1) the fatigue of the navigation officers and the seafarers (both physical 
and psychological), 2) the inadequate knowledge and skills of the navigation officers on 
their tasks, the ship and the navigation area, 3) inadequate team and safety culture of the 
navigation officers and the seafarers of the ships, 4) the shortage of experienced 
seafarers on ships and pilots at the Strait of Istanbul. 
 
Grabowski et al. (2007) have analyzed the leading indicators of tanker operations safety. 
The leading indicators are the conditions, events or measures that precede an 
undesirable event. As already stated, the causes of accidents are often the result of 
interactions among multiple, interdependent elements in complex and hazardous 
systems. The leading indicators can be categorized into individual, organizational or 
technical factors. The leading factors can be traced by analyzing whether a change in a 
certain factor could have prevented or significantly helped in preventing the undesirable 
event. Grabowski et al. (2007) have found that the leading indicators may differ by 
culture and different vessels may have different leading indicators of safety. Safety 
culture also exists on different levels: organizational safety culture, shipboard safety 
culture and the safety attitudes of individuals.  
 
Grabowski et al. (2007) also discovered that the safety performance of a vessel could 
not be predicted with the vessel’s characteristics, such as flag, classification society, 
trade, size, age, hull type or ownership. They concluded that most of the leading factors 
preceding an undesirable event focus on employee perceptions, satisfaction and 
assessments and the crew and supervisors worked with. 
 
In several studies, it has been observed that there are problems in the flow of maritime 
safety related information in the shipping industry. For example, in the accident 
investigation of Estonia passenger ferry, it was found out that shipping companies had 
noticed structural weaknesses in visors (which caused the Estonia accident), but this 
information had never reached the authorities (Hänninen 2007; Karvonen et al. 2006). 
Also, Lappalainen (2008) has learnt, in his study on implementation of the ISM Code, 
that there are serious deficiencies in the reporting of near misses in the shipping 
industry. In this kind of a situation, lessons from mistakes and weak points cannot be 
learnt, which reflects partly on the old-fashioned safety culture of the maritime industry.  
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Hänninen (2007) has pointed out in his study that the safety culture of the maritime 
industry is, in many ways, old-fashioned: 
• there is a high tolerance for accepting incidents and near misses in the maritime 
community 
• shipping companies are profit-oriented and neglect safety issues 
• mariners are not proactive on safety issues. 
 
It is still the basis of maritime law that the ship master is in absolute charge of his 
vessel. The master’s duties and responsibilities are numerous and extensive. He is, for 
example, the owner’s personal representative, bears the ultimate responsibility for the 
safety in the navigation of the vessel and for the loading, stowage and discharge of 
cargo. (Branch 2007) Pilots and VTS centres cannot command ships, only give advice, 
and the ship master decides whether they are followed. In case of an accident, the 
master (and other officers as well) can even be made criminally liable, even if there had 
not been any criminal intention or conscious negligence, especially so in case of 
environmental pollution (Lawford 2002). This practice seems quite odd when compared 
to other industries, e.g. aviation, and when thinking about safety culture on the 
organizational or industry-wide levels, which are probably a greater cause of accidents 
than the actions of a single officer on board. The practice was understandable when 
there were no ways to follow a ship after it left a port and no means (at least fast means) 
to communicate between the cargo owner and a ship master. This is definitely not the 
situation anymore. 
 
Maritime safety is, by nature, a very complex issue and it is as much related to culture 
as anything else. Such complex issues as language, authority and communication are all 
determined by individual and institutional relationships that may or may not be affected 
by jurisdiction and other policy instruments. Successful policies need to reflect the 
complexity of inter-relationships and the multiplicity of centres of authority that 
influence the safety and environmental standards and the implementation of penalties in 
the shipping industry. (Roe 2009)  
 
 
7.4 The effectiveness of the maritime safety policy system 
 
In Chapter 6, criteria for the effective maritime safety policy system were presented 
and, according to literature, effective maritime policy instruments should fulfil at least 
the following criteria: 1) effectiveness – the policy instrument must be suitable for 
achieving a desired goal, 2) economic efficiency – the benefits versus the costs of 
implementing the policy instrument should be in balance, 3) acceptability – the policy 
instrument must be accepted by the stakeholders and the community, 4) enforcement – 
the policy instrument can be implemented effectively, 5) lateral effects – the positive 
spill-over effects of the policy instrument in other sectors, 6) incentive and innovation – 
a good policy instrument encourages experimentation and gives incentives for 
improvement. In this chapter, each criterion is looked at in the light of the current 
maritime safety policy system in general – does it, as a whole, fulfil these criteria? 
Naturally, there are differences between single policies, but here the purpose is to look 
solely at the system as a whole, based on the previous chapters of this report. 
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Effectiveness – the policy instrument must be suitable for achieving a desired goal 
 
Most of the maritime safety policy instruments can be considered suitable for their 
purposes. They address the matters directly connected to the operational circumstances 
of a ship and their improvement is likely to have an impact on the safety of shipping. 
One of the problems is that international legislation seems to lack the capability to take 
local circumstances into consideration and to make fast responses when needed. The 
PSSA status system and the activity of the European Union to legislate maritime safety 
are signs of this problem. Another problem is that it seems difficult to find effective 
policies to tackle the human factor, when it is seen to be the main cause of most of the 
accidents at sea. 
 
Economic efficiency – the benefits versus the costs of implementing the policy 
instrument should be in balance 
 
Economic efficiency varies between different policies and it is difficult to estimate as a 
whole. For sure, some people say that safety regulations cost too much for the industry, 
because they are so extensive. In principle, the costs of implementing international 
regulations should not be the problem of the industry, because all actors bear the same 
costs. However, we know that this is not the case in the real world. The implementation 
level varies, and regional regulations and arrangements like the PSSA can alter the 
costs. Still, economic efficiency is a very important criterion. Resources should be 
allocated so that the maximum benefit is obtained. There is no point in making 
regulations that cost a great deal to the industry and have little impact. The problem is 
that costs and benefits are, in many cases, hard to calculate, as has been perceived, for 
example, in the studies on the FSA method (Chapter 6.2.2). It would also be important 
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the system, not just single policies. The evaluation 
of cost-effectiveness is an area that needs further development. 
 
Acceptability – the policy instrument must be accepted by the stakeholders and the 
community  
 
In a way, the slowness of the international regulation process reflects that policy 
instruments not accepted by the stakeholders cannot be legislated; the slow process is a 
sign that the stakeholders have differing opinions on the matter and it takes long to 
negotiate a result that can be accepted by a sufficient number of stakeholders. When 
looking at the broader community, it seems that it would be willing and ready to make 
tighter policies on maritime safety, but they are not accepted by the industry, or they are 
against the principles of the maritime law. For example, in many instances, it has been 
proposed that the VTS system should be extended to the whole Baltic Sea area, but at 
the moment, it is not possible, due to the international legislation not allowing coastal 
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Enforcement – the policy instrument can be implemented effectively  
 
This seems to be the core problem of the current system. International regulations based 
on the nation-state implementation are not functioning properly. On the global scale, 
there are too large differences in the ways of implementing maritime safety regulations. 
The existence of flags of convenience is the most visible sign of it. Differences in 
implementation lead to the other problems of the shipping industry. 
 
Lateral effects – the positive spill-over effects of the policy instrument in other sectors  
 
At its best, the maritime safety policy has many positive spill-over effects. Safer 
shipping means less human misery and less polluted seas. These achievements further 
affect the society positively in many ways. People are healthier, live longer and work 
longer. Ecosystems in seas are protected, which improves the possibilities to use the sea 
both for commercial and recreational activities, although these matters depend on many 
other issues, as well. Safe transportation also decreases transport damages and cargo 
loss. 
 
Incentive and innovation – a good policy instrument encourages experimentation and 
gives incentives for improvement  
 
The maritime safety policy is, in many aspects, very detailed, for example with regard 
to ship construction and equipment. The more detailed the legislation is, the less there is 
room for experimentation and innovations. Economic instruments are often thought to 
be better in promoting innovations, but they are not much used in the maritime safety 
policy. However, as it has been noticed (Chapter 6.1), it is not that straightforward. 
Regulatory instruments can encourage innovation as well, and economic instruments do 
not necessarily do that. Goal-based standards (Chapter 5.1.1) of ships can be regarded as 
an attempt to leave more room for innovations in ship construction, as long as certain 
requirements are met. Another example, the ISM Code, includes the requirements for 
continuous improvement, but as it has been perceived in the study of Lappalainen 
(2008), the shipping industry often lacks the kind of culture that aims at the continuous 
improvement of safety culture. In sum, how well maritime safety policy instruments 
encourage experimentation and innovation varies from policy to policy, but it looks like 
more attention has recently been paid to making policies that are more innovative and 
encouraging for continuous improvement. 
 
The current maritime safety policy system is effective in many respects, but its greatest 
weaknesses are the implementation and cost-effectiveness of policies and the failure of 
the system to diminish the role of the human factor as a cause of accidents. 
Implementation based on the nation state authorities has not succeeded on a global 
scale, and the problem with cost-effectiveness is that there is no reliable and 
comprehensive data on the costs of policies – both of single policies and of policies in 
comparison with each other. The system allows sub-standard shipping in many respects: 
the implementation of international legislation has not succeeded, other companies and 
actors agree to co-operate with obscure shipping companies and the consequences of 
sub-standard shipping are not severe enough. The savings resulting from sub-standard 
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operation of ships have been perceived to outweigh the penalties, if owners and 
operators are caught (Mitroussi 2004).  




The increasing shipping activity in the Gulf of Finland has raised concerns about the 
safety of maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland, especially about the possibility of a 
large oil accident due to the increasing oil export activity of Russia in the area. Various 
international, supra-national, regional and national policy instruments aim at 
minimizing the risks of accidents and other harmful effects of shipping. This report has 
dealt with maritime safety policy instruments: policy instruments in general; the central 
regulatory bodies of maritime safety; maritime safety policy instruments and the future 
prospects of maritime policy; the effectiveness of policy instruments; and the critique of 
the current maritime safety policy system. The purpose of the report has been to review 
the structure and state of the maritime safety policy system with focus on the Gulf of 
Finland. 
 
Policy instruments can be grouped to regulatory, economic and information guidance 
instruments. Maritime safety is enhanced with all these instrument types, although most 
prominently with regulatory instruments. Due to the international character of shipping 
industry, the regulation of maritime safety is mostly done at international level in the 
framework of the United Nations and the International Maritime Organization IMO. 
However, the European Union also has maritime safety regulations of its own, there are 
regional arrangements such as HELCOM, and some maritime safety related issues are 
regulated at the national level. 
 
Regulatory maritime safety instruments include regulations on mariners, navigational 
instruments, the surveillance of ship conditions and the construction and equipment of 
ships. Economic instruments include waterway and port dues, marine insurance, P&I 
clubs, liability and compensation questions and incentives. The use of economic 
instruments to promote public maritime safety goals is still in a minor position, but there 
are some examples that have potential for wider use. Information guidance is based on 
voluntary actions, and besides the dissemination of information, it can include subjects 
like voluntary training and education, certification or awards.  
 
It seems that the risks of maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland and in the Baltic Sea are 
taken seriously, and a lot of work is done to find new ways to decrease these risks: the 
International Maritime Organization is developing its regulations; in the European 
Union level, a comprehensive III Maritime Safety Package has been approved, and the 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, where maritime safety issues are high on the agenda, 
was published recently; HELCOM is promoting environmental issues of the Baltic Sea; 
and national authorities and politicians are also addressing maritime safety issues. Also, 
other sectors, such as research or, for example, environmental organizations, are 
organizing seminars and gathering and sharing information in order to promote 
maritime safety in the Baltic Sea. It will remain to be seen to what extend and in what 
timetable the planned actions and instruments will be implemented and what kinds of 
effects they will have. Still, from the political point of view, it cannot be said that the 
risks of maritime traffic in the Gulf of Finland and in the Baltic Sea are not noticed. 
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New regulations are planned or are going to be implemented, especially ones related to 
the environmental effects of shipping (emissions, anti-fouling substances, alien species 
etc.) and to the navigation (AIS-based systems, electronic charts etc.). It is also often 
noticed that the human factor in maritime safety risks needs more attention. However, it 
seems to be difficult to find policies effective in minimizing the effect of the human 
factor in maritime accidents and incidents. Training is most often offered as a solution, 
but as human errors mostly emerge from the organizational safety culture, the training 
of mariners cannot solely be expected to be very efficient. 
 
According to literature, effective maritime policy instruments should fulfil at least the 
following criteria: 1) effectiveness – the policy instrument must be suitable for 
achieving a desired goal, 2) economic efficiency – the benefits versus the costs of 
implementing the policy instrument should be in balance, 3) acceptability – the policy 
instrument must be accepted by the stakeholders and the community, 4) enforcement – 
the policy instrument can be implemented effectively, 5) lateral effects – the positive 
spill-over effects of the policy instrument in other sectors, 6) incentive and innovation – 
a good policy instrument encourages experimentation and gives incentives for 
improvement.  
 
Policy instruments should be evaluated together, because a set of policies is likely to be 
more effective than just one policy alone. The evaluation of policy instruments together 
is also important in order to avoid the use of conflicting policy instruments 
simultaneously. Maritime safety policy instruments can be evaluated by using, for 
example, the formal safety assessment (FSA) method developed by IMO.  
 
There are a vast number of maritime safety regulations, and the overall number of 
maritime accidents has decreased during past decades. Most of the regulations have 
been effective in preventing accidents and incidents. Still, accidents and incidents 
happen at sea and the current regulation system can be criticized on several points. The 
international regulation process is not easy; it tends to be slow and the result can 
become a compromise of compromises. Regulations are mostly reactive instead of 
preventive, and they are only revised after accidents. The work of IMO is based on the 
participation of nation states primarily promoting their own interests instead of looking 
at the entity. The implementation of regulations is carried out by flag states, and all flag 
states do not have the same implementation standards. To ensure the seaworthiness of 
ships, several inspection systems aim at eliminating the operation of sub-standard ships, 
but they are still able to sail in the world seas. The failure of IMO to provide fast 
responses and take into consideration the local circumstances in regulations has lead to 
a situation, where, for example, the European Union gives its own maritime safety 
legislation and there are such arrangements as Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas.  
 
Many kinds of companies operate in the shipping industry: companies that take safety 
matters seriously and act responsibly, and companies that aim to operate as cheaply as 
possible, do not care about safety measures, often have very obscure owner 
arrangements and are difficult to bring to account if something happens. All these 
companies compete in the same market and should follow the same regulations, but in 
practice they do not, which is enabled by the failure of the flag state system to 
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implement regulations similarly all over the world. The operation of irresponsible 
shipping companies is also enabled by shippers who take the cheapest transport at the 
expense of safety and by other actors who play ball with such companies. The careless 
attitude to safety can also partly be attributed to the old-fashioned culture of the 
shipping industry, for example, there is a high tolerance to accept incidents and near 
misses in the maritime community. 
 
When comparing the current maritime safety policy system as a whole with the criteria 
of effective policies, it can be concluded that, in many respects, the current system is 
effective with the greatest problems being in implementation and cost-effectiveness. 
The nation state based implementation system is not functioning properly, and the 
existence of flags of convenience is the clearest sign of that. The cost-effectiveness of 
policies is hard to calculate, both of single policies and of the policies in comparison 
with each other. This is an area where further research and better methods are needed. 
 
New approaches to shipping policy, such as multi-level governance or polycentric 
governance systems, have been proposed. Multi-level governance means that central 
government authority is dispersed both vertically, to locate at other territorial levels, and 
horizontally, to non-state actors. Multi-level governance is thus characterized by 
overlapping and multiple jurisdictions, in contrast to the simple hierarchical approach, 
and it allows the integration of state and non-state actors and the dispersion of state 
activity to supra-national, regional and local authorities in a way that reflects the 
shipping industry itself. Polycentric governance systems go one step further; they create 
a more complex policy-making framework encompassing a variety of policy-generating 
origins across all types of institutions, both private and public (governments, interest 
groups, political parties, commercial companies etc.). International jurisdiction 
determines the levels, but the concrete measures can be decided locally in co-operation 
with different actors. These governance systems may offer a mechanism to reflect the 
actual activities within the maritime sector and the priorities of the stakeholders 
involved. However, such a change in international legislation seems remote. 
 
Third parties could also have more power to influence the behaviour of firms in regard 
to public interests. They can implement incentives or sanctions on other parties, from 
the making or breaking of social and economic relationships to concrete financial 
penalties formalized in legally binding contracts. In the shipping industry, such third 
party actors as associations of ship-owners, cargo owners, insurers, classification 
societies and banks have the potential to exert an influence over ship safety and 
environmental standards.   
 
The third parties could be enrolled to assist the public policy, for instance, by holding 
them liable for environmental damage caused by their clients, making it a legal 
requirement for the targets of regulations to use the machinery of third parties (such as 
auditors or insurers). It should also be discussed what the liability of a cargo owner and 
a shipper is in case of accidents. It has also been observed that the marine system lacks 
egalitarian stakeholder groups to monitor risks and risk taking behaviour in maritime 
transportation.  
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In conclusion, maritime safety is enhanced by a great number of regulations on many 
levels, and the system has been partly effective in promoting maritime safety. 
Instruments used are mostly regulatory, and economic instruments could probably be 
used more to promote maritime safety. Still, there are some inherent problems in the 
system: flag state based implementation; the difficulty of making truly global and 
effective regulations that can react quickly to the need for change; and the problems of 
safety culture in the shipping industry. Before these problems are solved, the major 
improvements in maritime safety cannot be expected to happen, and, ultimately, single 
policies will only be band-aid solutions to the problem, not interfering in the actual 
causes of bleeding. It would be important to think thoroughly of how the shipping 
industry could best be motivated to improve maritime safety – is it through technical 
systems or perhaps by some other means? 
 
 
8.1 Further research 
 
Research on the maritime safety policy instruments will continue in the SAFGOF 
research project for which this report forms a basis. The focus will be on the policies 
reducing the probability of an oil accident and its environmental effects in the Gulf of 
Finland. Work is continued with expert questionnaires and interviews, and the aim is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the current system and its need for improvement on the 
empirical level. A few new policies will be selected whose effectiveness will be tested 
in the SAFGOF meta-model, in other words, the tests will explore how the 
implementation of the selected policies affects the accident probabilities or 
environmental effects of an oil accident in the Gulf of Finland. The SAFGOF meta-
model is going to be a Bayesian belief network based probability model, which 
combines social, technical and environmental information. The SAFGOF meta-model is 
being built together with the Centre for Maritime Studies of the University of Turku, the 
Helsinki University of Technology and the University of Helsinki, who are the co-
partners in the SAFGOF project. The results of this study are also used in the SAFGOF 
project to spread the new knowledge to the field through different teaching and training 
packages produced in the WP 7 of the SAFGOF project. More information on the 
project can be found via the Internet-page: http://www.merikotka.fi/uk/SAFGOF.php.
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